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Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg, the Battles of Chaffin’s Bluff and Poplar Spring Church, September 29 – October 2, 1864

This was a pioneering study of an important military operation: in1980 the author’s approach to Civil War history was praised for its originality and value to serious students of the war. Richard Sommers was the first historian to write a tactically detailed narrative of a Civil War battle for the general audience. He was also the first historian to write about the Petersburg Campaign (aside from incidents such as the Battle of the Crater) since Major General Andrew Humphries, a participant in the campaign, wrote his history in 1883. Richmond Redeemed won numerous awards and is still regarded the definitive study of Grant’s Fifth Offensive against Petersburg and Richmond. Richard Sommers has inspired many other historians to write about Civil War battles from the tactical, small-unit, and personal points of view.
As already stated, this book analyzes Grant’s Fifth Offensive (September 29 – October 2, 1864), primarily the Battles of Chaffin’s Bluff (Fort Harrison) and Poplar Spring Church (Peebles’ Farm). The Union attack north of the James River at Chaffin’s Bluff broke through Richmond’s defenses and gave Federals their best opportunity to capture the Confederate capital. Fierce fighting by four United States Colored Troops brigades earned their soldiers thirteen Medals of Honor and marked Chaffin’s Bluff as the biggest, bloodiest battle for African-American units in the whole Civil War. The corresponding fighting outside Petersburg at Poplar Spring Church so threatened Southern supply lines that General Lee considered abandoning his Petersburg rail center six months before actually doing so. Hard fighting and skillful Confederate generalship saved both cities, and Richmond was ‘redeemed’ from capture for another half-year.

In the opening chapter, Sommers gives the reader a good idea of how the war was going for both sides at the time of the campaign, and what the opposing generals were trying to accomplish. He maintains the reader’s suspense by, in his own words “…never get[ting] ahead of myself by tipping off readers to the outcome. Readers step lively with the columns of march, charge with the brigades, man the ramparts with the defenders, plan with the generals, and struggle with those commanders to try to fathom the uncertainty of battle and of war.” He draws heavily on the personal accounts of commanders and private soldiers; using literally thousands of letters, reports, and memoirs drawn from over 100 archives throughout the nation.  His maps (and the explanations provided on each map) depict the actions down to regimental level, helping the reader to quickly understand the terrain and the troop movements.

For this Sesquicentennial re-issue of the book Sommers adds several appendixes, including a day-by-day timeline of the offensives and the Senior Officers of the Fifth Offensive, cross-referenced by State, Grade and Command. He has not just re-issued, he has re-written his book, crediting his additions or re-interpretations to over twenty years of “…new research, new writing, and most of all new thinking.” Since 2008, he taught electives and core courses to students at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. War College students are Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels as well as Navy and Coast Guard Captains and Commanders who had demonstrated potentiality to become Generals and Admirals. Sommers presented military history, including the Petersburg Campaign, in their courses. He contributed to the officers development as senior strategic leaders, and gained valuable new insights from them “…through their real-world experience in making military history….” which contributed greatly to his understanding of generalship and high command, adding greatly to the value of his final-chapter’s analysis of the generalship of Generals Robert Lee, Ulysses Grant, A. P. Hill, Gouverneur Warren and the other commanders.

This book is highly recommended to those who want to develop an understanding of “how they fought” during this campaign as well as in the latter part of the war, or who want to understand the very important mid-point of the Petersburg Campaign.

 

Review by David Lady

That Furious Struggle: Chancellorsville and the High Tide of the Confederacy, May 1-4, 1863

Chancellorsville is a classic in the study not only of the Civil War and military history in general, but also of leadership, risk-taking, and military tactics.

The First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run) on July 21, 1861, had shown that indeed there would be large-scale, open war between north and south.  The Battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862) had shown that the war would be long, hard-fought, and bloody.  And as the 1863 campaign season got underway, with major battles already having been fought in all theaters, the war appeared to stretch indefinitely into the future.

Thus the armies of Robert E. Lee the Army of Northern Virginia, and Joseph “Fighting Joe” Hooker the Army of the Potomac faced each other in April-May, 1863, across the Rappahannock River in a thickly-wooded region known as “the Wilderness” west of Fredericksburg.  The Army of the Potomac was the Union’s premier maneuver force in the Eastern Theater.  Steeped in the theories of Antoine-Henri Jomini (as were all that had attended West Point before the war), Union leadership looked to the east (principally Virginia) as the critical theater of war.  Several times the Army of the Potomac had sought decisive victory in major set-piece battles.  And despite not yet having achieved victory, Major General Hooker intended to have another go at it.  As with his predecessors, he was confident of victory (and admittedly, his, was a good plan of maneuver), yet he was just as unsuccessful as they had been.  What makes this battle particularly interesting was that General Lee had absented a major portion of his force (First Corps, under Lieutenant General James B. Longstreet) south to Suffolk, Virginia and nearby parts of North Carolina to forage for food and supplies for the Army of Northern Virginia.  Thus General Lee and a reduced Army of Northern Virginia faced a reinvigorated AoP and, making great use of Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, had to execute some truly brilliant tactics to once again defeat it.

Mackowski and White capture the battle with a concise, yet reasonably detailed description of the engagements, supporting movements, and the key personalities, including an excellent description of the wounding of Jackson.  The writing is generally crisp and effective, and is supported by maps of sufficient detail to allow the reader to understand the action.  There are a large number of photos and diagrams from the time, as well as more current photos of the terrain that will facilitate touring the battlefield, although some of these are dark with resultant loss of detail.  The book includes five appendices on related topics, a detailed order of battle for both sides down to regimental and battery level, and a suggested reading list for further study.

All in all, this is a good primer on the campaign.  But it is more than that.  The book’s strength is its battlefield tour guide.  Interwoven into the text, it will facilitate the planning of personal and professional tours of all or parts of the battle area, particularly for families with elementary through high school children who want to walk and see the ground over the course of a two or three-day weekend, perhaps with evening readings as a review of the coming day’s tour.  The Chancellorsville battlefield is a beautiful piece of ground and would make for a great family outing.  Mackowski’s and White’s book would provide an ideal supplement.

 

Review by Emil Posey

Bloody Autumn: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864

The Shenandoah Valley played an important supporting role in the Civil War.  With the apt nickname “The Breadbasket of the Confederacy”, it supplied Confederate forces in the eastern theater, particularly the Army of Northern Virginia, with grains, produce and livestock necessary to their survival.  That part that was in “friendly hands” protected the flank of operations, Union as well as Confederate, in eastern Virginia; the part that wasn’t in “friendly hands” posed a significant flanking threat.  In 1862 it was the theater in which Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson rose to lasting fame by demonstrating his tactical and operational skills holding three Union armies at bay and thus likely saving the Army of Northern Virginia from encirclement and destruction.  It then became the Army of Northern Virginia’s axis of advance into Maryland (1862) and Pennsylvania (1863) and its main supply route (or MSR) during both of these campaigns.  In July 1864 it was the axis of advance for yet another Confederate offensive into Maryland, this time under the command of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early who, with his Army of the Valley District, menaced the defensive lines of Washington, DC and even brought President Abraham Lincoln under fire on July 12 at Ft. Stevens (albeit this was occasioned more by President Lincoln’s curiosity than by Early’s offensive posture at that point).

 

Early could not sustain the pressure on Washington, however, and withdrew back into the Shenandoah Valley.  Union Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander of all Union forces (since March 1864), decided it was time to neutralize the Valley as a threat.  He centralized command lines of authority in the region and placed Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan in command of the Army of the Shenandoah.

 

It was Sheridan’s job to shut the Valley down.  Starting out on August 9 from his conference with Grant at Monocacy Station, Maryland, Sheridan (who latest position had been Maj. Gen. Meade’s, i.e., the Army of the Potomac’s, chief of cavalry) rode to Harpers Ferry and commenced to do just that.  Over the next two months fighting raged up and down the valley: at Guard Hill, Summit Point, Berryville, Winchester, Fisher’s Hill, Tom’s Brook, and Cedar Creek – battles dim in the knowledge of many, but engagements in a campaign of significance.

 

Davis and Greenwalt capture the campaign with a concise, yet reasonably detailed description of the engagements, supporting movements, and key personalities, particularly their ongoing discussions of Early and Sheridan.  The writing is generally crisp and effective, although occasionally it does get a bit tedious.  There are numerous maps, but of only mediocre detail.  There is a large number of photos, but several of the landscape shots are dark, with resultant loss of detail.  The book includes four appendices on related topics, and a detailed order of battle for both sides down to regimental and battery level.

 

All in all, this is a good primer on the campaign.  But it is more than that.  The book’s strength is its four driving tour guides – Third Winchester, Fisher’s Hill and Tom’s Brook, Cedar Creek, and “Two Fallen Officers: Alexander Pendleton and John Rodgers Meigs”.  These will facilitate the planning of personal and professional tours of all or parts of this August-October 1864 campaign area, particularly for families with elementary through high school children who want to walk and see the ground over the course of a two or three-day weekend, perhaps with evening readings as a review of the coming day’s tour.  The Shenandoah Valley is a beautiful piece of ground and would make for a great family outing.  Davis’s and Greenwalt’s book would provide an ideal supplement.

 

Review by Emil Posey

“The Devil’s to Pay”: John Buford at Gettysburg. a History and Walking Tour

There were thousands of battles in the Civil War, dozens of them categorized as major by any standard – number of combatants engaged, number of casualties, military or political significance, and so forth.  Of these, many consider the Battle of Gettysburg to be the capstone.  It certainly is the most studied of Civil War engagements.  It pitted against each other the best and the worst of leaders, leadership, tactics, and logistics.  At the tactical level, Brigadier General John Buford is emblematic of the best on either side.  His performance in command of the United States First Cavalry Division in the campaign leading into, during, and in the immediate aftermath of the battle provides classic examples of leadership, determination, and tactics that are studied by military professionals to this day.

Eric Wittenberg has captured this well.  Not only is his book superbly researched, documented, and written, it is a grand book – not in size, at a modest 245 pages, but certainly in subject, scope and sweep.  With an engaging style, it is fast-paced, easy to ready and comprehend, and covers not only the operational and tactical levels, but individual officers and soldiers involved – on both sides.

Now, I already knew about Buford and his gaining time to the west and north of Gettysburg as the Army of the Potomac closed in.  So, in addition to being a good read, what did I get out of the book?  What did I learn?

For one, Buford’s background, family and personal, and a detailed insight into his character.  A Kentuckian by birth, he was destined to be a soldier.  Coming from a family history of military service stretching back to the Revolution, he naturally vectored in that direction.  He developed superior horsemanship skills as a youth, which pushed him towards the cavalry.  Graduating from West Point in 1848 (16th out of a class of 42), he showed strong leadership qualities from the beginning of his career.  Eric discusses his various unit assignments from graduation through the beginning of the war.  He was in uniform the entire period.  Buford’s family split in their loyalties, with an older half-brother taking the Union side, briefly commanding a division under Ulysses S. Grant, and a first cousin that went South commanding a division of cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest.  Buford struggled with his loyalty to Kentucky, but despite a personal plea from the South-leaning governor, his loyalty to the US Army and the US government it served won out.  He served primarily in staff positions in the first two years of the war, although he commanded a reserve cavalry brigade with distinction in the Second Battle of Bull Run (getting wounded in the process).  He got back into field command in February 1863, serving as a cavalry brigade commander under Major General George Stoneman before being selected for command of the First Cavalry Division in May 1863.  From there, the war led him to Gettysburg.

I also gained a deeper appreciation for the fighting quality of his division at all levels and, in particular, his brigade commanders.  His subordinate commands and commanders at Gettysburg are discussed in detail.  Eric makes extensive use of contemporary accounts (newspaper articles, official reports, journals and diaries, and personal letters).  He includes period photos and thumbnail bios of every commander of significance on both sides of the battle.

Most of all, I came away with a better understanding of the truly pivotal role Buford and his division played on July 1.  The skill and determination displayed not only by Buford but his brigade commanders*, Colonels William Gamble (First Brigade) and Thomas C. Devin (Second Brigade), along with several of the division’s subordinate leaders, such as Lt. John H. Calef, commanding Battery A, 2nd US Artillery, was exemplary.  What Buford and his division accomplished that day was amazing, and Eric captures it in detail from start to finish.  (* Colonel Wesley Merritt commanded the Reserve Brigade, which had been assigned to security duties in the army’s rear and was not present on battlefield on July 1.)

The book also includes several helpful appendices.  A detailed order of battle of course, plus discussions about the Spencer rifle, and analyses of crucial events on the battlefield.  These contribute to the insights Eric brings to the battle.

Oh, and then there is the walking and driving tour guidance.  Eric points you towards specific sites associated with Buford and the US First Cavalry Division’s actions.  The photos, period and current, particularly those looking west on Chambersburg Pike and Mummasburg Road, will help calibrate one’s view today.  The GPS coordinates will be of particular use finding some of the spots.  All in all, this is a good, comprehensive guide.

There were several notable episodes of superior leadership and skill on the Gettysburg battlefield over its three days, and Eric has described one of the most important.  Buford’s delaying action on Herr Ridge and Seminary Ridge on July 1 enabled the Union Army of the Potomac to secure good defensive ground.  Had he and the US First Cavalry Division not performed as they did, the Battle of Gettysburg may well have been a one-day affair, with the decisive battle being fought later at some other locale (the Pipe Creek Line in Maryland, for example), possibly with a different outcome.  As it was, he delayed the Army of Northern Virginia and thereby set up what would be one of the decisive battles of the war.

This book is a great read!  I recommend it highly.  Eric Wittenberg is an accomplished Civil War cavalry historian and author, and I look forward to reading as many of his other books as I can manage.

 

Review by Emil Posey

No Turning Back: A Guide to the 1864 Overland Campaign, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May 4 – June 13, 1864

This book is an example of the title absolutely reflecting the contents.  The core of the book is a series of directions, buttressed by maps, numerous black and white photographs (Civil War era and modern), and GPS coordinates.  The text first gives directions to a stopping point, then explains its significance to the battle or campaign in several paragraphs.  These directions allow the reader to visit not only the famous battlefields that are preserved, but also to follow the routes taken by the armies and to visit the remaining ante bellum buildings that were used as headquarters and hospitals.

After a brief overview of the strategic situation in the Eastern Theater as of early May, 1864, the narrative outlines the campaign’s opening moves, with detailed directions to Germanna Ford on the Rapidan River where Wilson’s cavalry dispersed Confederate pickets.  There are fourteen stops for the Battle of the Wilderness alone and at many of them there are footpaths leading to various points of interest.  This is nothing, however.  There are thirty-one stops covering the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House and subsequent maneuvers down to the North Anna River.  The books covers the thirty-one stops in fifty-two pages—a nice balance between explanation, illustration, and directions.  Once the North Anna is reached, another twenty-one stops cover the North Anna and Totopotomoy Creek engagements before moving on to Cold Harbor and finally the James River in another fifteen stops.  The book ends as Grant tries to outmaneuver Lee by crossing the James and moving on Petersburg.

The authors (one of whom, Donald Pfanz, is the son of the author of the famous two-volume set on the second day of Gettysburg) recommend taking two or three days just to follow the directions given.  I would say it may take even longer if you desire to walk any of the trails.

The book itself is a long-needed supplement to the very detailed War College Battlefield guides for these same battles.  Written for a layman with good general knowledge of the Civil War, the book provides an up-to-date route (current roads) guide and a more friendly description of the various actions as compared to the War College books.  I highly recommend it to those who want to take such a tour, even if only parts of the various battlefields.  The GPS coordinates even allow one to tour vicariously via Google Earth!

 

Reviewed by John Scales

To the Bitter End: Appomattox, Bennett Place, and the Surrenders of the Confederacy

This volume covers the surrenders of all the major Confederate military and naval forces, including the forces of Native American tribes allied with the Confederacy. The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on April 9, 1865 was only the first of the Confederate Army surrenders in 1865. Large Confederate organizations still remained in North Carolina and the southeastern states, in Alabama and Mississippi, and across the Mississippi River in Texas, Arkansas and the Indian Territory. With the Confederate capitol occupied by the United States Army, and with President Davis and his government on the run, the surrender of this most famous Confederate army only indirectly led to the suspension of hostilities throughout the former Confederacy.

Robert Dunkerly is a National Park Service Ranger and historian who has worked at Appomattox Court House, and who currently works at the Richmond National Battlefield Park, and is president of the Richmond, VA Civil War Round Table. He is a regular contributor to the Emerging Civil War blog and has co-authored this book as part of the Savas Beatie Emerging Civil War Series. Among his other books is No Turning Back: A Guide to the 1864 Overland Campaign.

Dunkerly has written a very interesting and informative account covering the series of Confederate surrenders that took place over an almost-three month period. He startled me by pointing out that Appomattox was an anomaly among the surrenders: The Federal and Confederate armies were in very close proximity to each other; the surrender terms were decided upon and signed at one meeting; a formal ceremony took place at which weapons, munitions and army property were surrendered; paroles were issued to all Confederates that surrendered. Nowhere else in the South was surrendering a major organization so quick and formal.

In contrast to the surrender at Appomattox Court House, the surrender of the other major Confederate organizations were sloppy affairs, requiring two or more meetings to develop acceptable surrender terms. These surrenders encompassed larger Confederate forces over very large ‘departmental’ areas, and the Federal and Confederate combatants were not in close proximity of each other. Paroles were issued to the surrendering forces at various places over a period of weeks and months; many Confederates never receiving their paroles. More weapons were simply abandoned in place than ceremoniously turned-over to the U. S. government.

There was much unrest and some disobedience among the remaining Confederate forces and many soldiers simply went home, causing some organizations to dissolve.  One Confederate department commander, General Edmund K. Smith, surrendered the Trans-Mississippi area because his Texan and Louisianan troops became mutinous and forced the decision on him and his subordinate commanders. The last Confederate organization to surrender was the First Indian Cavalry Brigade on 23 June, 1865. This unit was commanded by Brigadier General Stand Watie of the Cherokee Nation and composed of Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and Osage soldiers.

Although the terms of the Appomattox Surrender applied only to the Army of Northern Virginia and a few attached organizations, this event was invested with symbolic importance by both sides. The surrender involved both commanding generals, Lieutenant General Grant of the U. S. Army and General Lee (Confederate commanding general since January, 1865). These men were the greatest and most respected generals of their respective sides, and the terms offered by Grant and accepted by Lee represented President Lincoln’s ‘let ‘em up easy’ philosophy. These terms were approved by Lincoln, reiterated by the U. S. War Department, and were used by the other Federal and Confederate army commanders to guide their negotiations.

With news of General Lee’s surrender, the attitudes of most soldiers on both sides changed after 9 April, 1865. Most accepted that the war was nearly over, and many Federal and Confederate leaders discouraged further combat. Federal commanders adopted a largely peace making and civil support role; Confederate commanders negotiated to define and secure the legal status their soldiers and themselves within the United States. The soldiers of both sides longed (and sometimes simply left) to get home as quickly as possible. Evidence that most Confederate commanders advised their soldiers to resume law-abiding civilian lives is represented by quotations from the farewell messages of Generals Lee and Forrest to their soldiers.

Mr. Dunkerly also writes of how the Confederate surrender has been remembered in history and literature and of how the respectful and generous terms and ceremonies of Appomattox came to represent the reconciliation between the white citizens of the North and the South.  The various and sometimes unexpected fates of the various surrender sites are explained. Finally, Dunkerly provides visitors’ information for those interested in the sites, monuments, and museums devoted to surrender ceremonies.

I recommend this book as a good read and a road-trip guide.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

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