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“The Bloody Fifth” – Volume 2: Gettysburg to Appomattox

This is the second installment by author John F. Schmultz on the Texas Brigade. Volume 1 addressed the brigade from Session to the Suffolk Campaign and outlined the basic tenants of a great history; the brigade origin, structure, leaders, and ample commentary from the most critical element of the Brigade – the soldiers in the ranks.

Volume 2 continues in similar fashion and includes campaign planning agreed upon by President Davis and General Robert E. Lee. Operational and tactical decisions that challenged the brigade’s success and have been debated for over 150 years. But, the critical part of any organization is the rank and file that must execute the orders of their officers. The author portrays their roll, not only in battle, but on the march, through the wants of food, water, rest and the inadequacies experiences as a result of Confederate government, Army of Northern Virginia policy and their adversaries in blue. The sentiment of the soldiers on life, religion, family, and their fellow soldiers combine to illustrate the complex dynamics of a Brigade in the formation of the Army of Northern Virginia.

For those that follow the tactics and battle drama there are ample maps illustrating the movement of the Brigade from Gettysburg to Appomattox. The authors extensive bibliography adequately captures the long standing authors and more recent illustrations of the circumstances that faced the Brigade to illustrate all its glory, its human loss, and conflicts in leadership.

“The Bloody Fifth” is one of those Regimental histories that deserves to be read, referenced, and enjoyed for many years.

 

Reviewed by Arley McCormick

The Generals of Shiloh: Character in Leadership, April 6-7, 1862

Author Larry Tagg introduces the General Officer leadership in the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of Ohio, and the Army of the Mississippi in the context of the Battle at Shiloh. General Ulysses Grant, General Don Carlos Buell, General Albert Sidney Johnston, General P.G.T. Beauregard, General Braxton Bragg, General Leonidas Polk were mostly inexperienced commanders of large formations in battle. But, what of the other Generals that fought? Many demonstrated acceptable and commendable leadership and were recognized by their leaders and historians. Others were disgraced by their conduct at Shiloh and other battlefields during the war. Many, possibly the majority, are less recognizable names that essentially are relegated to footnotes indicating they were there, and if nowhere else, were heroes in their hometowns and states.

The author does a commendable job with narratives that explain where and how they reached the level of General in such a short period of time. Even Larry Tagg struggles to find sufficient information on many that would endear them to the Civil War enthusiast and spark energetic research.

The author describes their leadership in the fog of battle where it is not uncommon for orders and directions to be confusing, absent, delayed, or just wrong. During a drama surrounded with piercing noise, obscuring smoke and debris he illustrates how they may have seen the battle unfold and how they reacted.

Each officer is described from the origin of their appointment to their role at Shiloh. A commendable effort that any Civil War enthusiast will appreciate and want to add to their understanding of Generalship in battle.

 

Reviewed by Arley McCormick

The Chickamauga Campaign: Glory or the Grave (vol. 2) and Barren Victory (vol. 3)

The Chickamauga Campaign was a series of battles and maneuvering from Aug. 21 to Sept. 20, 1863 in northwest Georgia, fought between the Union’s Army of the Cumberland and the Confederacy’s Army of Tennessee. The North eventually won the war, but the battle of Chickamauga was a crucial victory for the South.

The Chickamauga Campaign: Glory of the Grave
The Chickamauga Campaign: Glory of the Grave

   Author David Powell has completed the second and third volumes in what is considered the best in-depth study of the Chickamauga Campaign. These are The Chickamauga Campaign: Glory or the Grave, and The Chickamauga Campaign: Barren Victory. Powell’s magnificent study fully explores the battle from all perspectives and is based upon over fifteen years of intensive study and research that has uncovered nearly 2,000 primary sources from generals to private, all stitched together to relate the remarkable story that was Chickamauga. Using a plethora of first-hand accounts and regimental studies, many of which have never been heard of or read about, Powell takes the reader on a journey into the soldier’s lives and actions during their time in Tennessee and Georgia in 1863.

The Chickamauga Campaign: Barren Victory
The Chickamauga Campaign: Barren Victory

   In Glory or the Grave, published in 2015, the actions of September 20, 1863 are presented and discussed. The book was awarded the prestigious Richard B. Harwell Book Award for best book on a Civil War subject published in 2015. Barren Victory appeared in 2016 and provides the close of the battle and the entire campaign from September 21 to October 20, 1863, and contains additional sources for research, an extensive bibliography, and various appendices on the battle, battlefield, and the surrounding north Georgia and southeastern Tennessee areas.

Although not required reading, Mr. Powell’s previously published work, The Maps of Chickamauga, is a very helpful resource when reading the trilogy. The maps really help visualize the action(s) described in the book, especially if you’re reading about the battle for the first time or if you are tracking down the movements of a particular regiment or brigade across the hills and valleys of North Georgia.

Also, for those of you who just can’t seem to get enough information on the battles and events surrounding the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns, David Powell has a blog, Chickamauga Blog (https://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/).

 

Reviewed by Lee Hattabaugh

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Under the Crescent Moon with the XI Corps in the Civil War: From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, 1862-1863

Under the Crescent Moon is the first volume of a history of the famous, or infamous, Union army corps that somewhat unfairly received the blame for the collapse of Union lines at Chancellorsville and during Gettysburg’s first day. The purpose of the author is clear: remove the stain associated with the corps by blaming its commander O. O. Howard and anti-German (“Dutch”) prejudice for its sullied reputation. This first volume covers first discusses the officers who initially served under Sigel in the Valley and under Pope at II Manassas and followed him as his troops were designated the XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Serving in the defenses of Washington during Antietam and arriving too late for Fredericksburg, the corps was something of a stepchild to start with. Sigel’s resignation and replacement by Howard did not help. After the first hundred pages or so which moved rather slowly, the author delves deeply into the Battle of Chancellorsville for the balance of the book. Apparently, Gettysburg will be treated in Volume II. The author makes a convincing case that Howard was primarily to blame for the collapse of the corps in the face of Jackson’s attack and a somewhat less convincing argument that the corps was militarily very capable. I think he somewhat overstates his case, but he does advance some excellent arguments and the discussion of the battle at the regiment level is very interesting.

 

Reviewed by John Scales

The Campaigns and Battles of General Nathan Bedford Forrest

We are a most favored Round Table, to have as one of our members a soldier-scholar such as John Scales. In this, his third book, he presents a thorough but concise review of each of Nathan B. Forrest’s battles and campaigns, as well as a careful evaluation of Forrest’s contributions for good or ill to the outcome of the American Civil War

John’s straight narrative format guides us from Forrest’s first documented activities, as a Lieutenant Colonel leading a battalion of cavalry in 1861, though his surrender as a Lieutenant General in 1865. Drawing from his military experience as a general officer, John provides valuable evaluations of General Forrest’s maturing as a leader, tactician, and strategist. These evaluations are based on the careful comparison of original reports, letters, memoirs, as well as other evidence provided by Forrest, his soldiers and fellow commanders, and his foes. These evaluations are also based on years of careful research into the routes traveled by Forrest and his soldiers to every skirmish site and battlefield on which they fought.

The actual “trails” identified this book are John’s unique gifts to civil war historians and enthusiasts; he provides excellent maps but also detailed driving instructions and GPS positions, allowing readers to closely follow the trails taken by Forrest and his soldiers on literally every one of their campaigns during the war. Aided by the magnificent topographical maps of Hal Jespersen, John clearly illustrates and describes every one of Forrest’s battles during the war.

The assessment of Forrest’s strengths and shortcomings that concludes the book is very balanced and well-considered. This man was a magnificent tactical leader, a strategist and first-rate interpreter of military intelligence. Yet even as an experienced senior cavalry commander, his temper and penchant for front-line leadership made him less effective than he might have been, and gave his superiors good reasons for not entrusting him with the highest responsibilities.

This is not a book for someone searching for an N. B. Forrest biography. This is not the book for someone uninterested in criticism as well as praise for Forrest’s military actions. This is the best history and tour guide of Forrest’s military operations yet written. Get a copy and follow the trails!

 

Reviewed by David Lady

All the Fighting They Want: The Atlanta Campaign from Peachtree Creek to the City’s Surrender, July 18-September 2, 1864

Stephen Davis is a well-known historian of things American Civil War, especially as they pertain to the Atlanta Campaign.  Learning his craft under the tutelage of the late, great historian Bell Irvin Wiley, Dr. Davis has brought this campaign to life in a number of works including Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions (2001), and the companion to this book, A Long and Bloody Task: the Atlanta Campaign from Dalton through Kennesaw Mountain to the Chattahoochee River, May 5 – July 18, 1864 (2016).

This book is one in a series of works comprising the Emerging Civil War Series, published by Savas Beatie LLC, that, according to its website, “offers compelling and easy-to-read overviews of some of the Civil War’s most important battles and issues.”  What they are creating is a new, public platform for historical discourse, aimed at a new generation of historians.  While Dr. Davis does not belong to that generation necessarily, the effort – indeed, any effort to create new interest in America’s seminal event – is well warranted.  These works (currently, if my count is correct, there are 18!) examine various aspects of our favorite war with fresh new eyes.  The results, if this book is any indication, provide concise but thorough evaluations of battles and men that give the reader both the flavor of the subject as well as the taste to learn more.  In that, they are a success.

Should the reader desire, there is any number of books in the historiography of the Atlanta Campaign available for study.  In my opinion, the holy grail of these is Albert Castel’s Decision in the West: the Atlanta Campaign of 1864.  But of equal value are William Scaife’s The Campaign for Atlanta, Richard McMurry’s Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy, and, of course, the aforementioned works by Dr. Davis.  Believe me when I say that if you want to learn about this campaign that did so much to end the war, there are materials aplenty to help you in your search.

But let this book be your starting point.  Dr. Davis has done a great job of discussing the strategy and tactics of the endgame at Atlanta that makes it easy to read and easy to follow.  He seldom goes below Divisions when explaining the tactics of each engagement so the reader does not have to keep up with the movements and counter-movements of untold regiments that sometimes make the larger histories cumbersome.  And he provides plenty of maps, pictures, and markers to help the reader keep everything straight.  After telling the story, Dr. Davis even points the reader in the direction of learning more with instructions for a detailed driving tour of Atlanta, including all the monuments in and around the city, and hints of the tangible history that awaits at the Atlanta History Center and at the Cyclorama.  And finally, he even lays out the complete Union and Confederate Orders of Battle so the reader has a place to go to find his or her favorite regiment.

One of my favorite points of discussion here was of the tactics employed by the commanding generals.  Most of the histories talk of how Sherman maneuvered the Confederacy out of Atlanta, aided in the end by the wild frontal assaults of his opponent, John Bell Hood.  Dr. Davis points out that even though he maneuvered Joseph Johnston out of Georgia (and out of a job!), on five occasions (Resaca, New Hope Church, Pickett’s Mill, Kennesaw Mountain, and Utoy Creek) during the campaign, Sherman ordered frontal assaults on entrenched positions.  All were repulsed.  Hood, on the other hand, cast as a General who knew only how to attack, continually envisioned getting his army on Sherman’s flanks.  For a number of reasons, this didn’t happen, but as Dr. Davis says, “After a century and a half, the literature has yet to catch up on this point.”

How important was the Atlanta Campaign?  Mary Boykin Chestnut put it this way: “These stories of our defeats in the Valley (Shenandoah Valley where Sheridan had defeated Early) fall like blows on a dead body.  Since Atlanta, I have felt as if all were dead within me, forever.”  Again, Dr. Davis sums it up best.

“History is what it is.  The best we in today’s armchair can conclude is that the North won the American Civil War, and that General William T. Sherman’s capture of Atlanta was a signal event contributing to Union victory.”

Learn about that event here.  If you’ve always wanted to know more about how Atlanta was “fairly won”, but thought you didn’t have the time to read the big books or visit the city, the All the Fighting They Want is the book for you.  And you just may find that you have the time for more after all.

 

Reviewed by John Mason

No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar: Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, March 1865

When first published in 2006, this book was almost the sole recent battlefield study of the Carolinas Campaign and has long been out-of-print. However, it remains the only tactical-level account of the Battle of Averasboro. This reprint contains excellent new maps, newer photos, a battlefield driving tour guide, and additional appendixes concerning including one concerning “The Lost Gunner’s Quadrant.” Savas Beatie publishers have created a more useful and attractive volume, aimed at the general as well as the specialist reader.

Both Mark Smith and Wade Sokolosky were career Army officers, now retired and continuing their research into the events of the Carolinas Campaign. Well regarded as writers and battlefield tour guides, another of their collaborations is “To Prepare for Sherman’s Coming, The Battle of Wise’s Forks, March 1865,” which is also a Savas Beatie publication.

The title of this reprint quotes Joseph Johnston, who marveled at the agility and endurance of Sherman’s men as they rapidly marched from Savannah through South Carolina in February and March, 1865. The Federal Army successfully negotiated the twenty-two miles of thick swamp and rainfall-flooded streams of the Salkehatchie River basin, advancing between two Confederate armies to race through central South Carolina. Corduroying roads to permit their wagons to keep pace, Sherman’s men continued to forage liberally and destroy public property; as in the March to the Sea, they left ruined cities and a devastated civilian population in their wake.

Solokosky and Smith begin their narrative as Sherman’s men entered North Carolina and approach the city and arsenal of Fayetteville on the Cape Fear River. Opposing the Federals was an outnumbered force of veteran infantry and recently evacuated coastal garrison artillerists under General William Hardee. He was operating under General Johnston’s orders to delay the Federal march and allow the Confederates time to gather their scattered forces for a counterattack against Sherman. Hardee realized that he’d not enough men or cannon to hold all bridges or crossing sites along the Cape Fear. He also suspected that Sherman’s men were marching on the fortified Federal-held river port of Goldsboro. Abandoning the river line but risking a battle, Hardee chose as his position a “choke point,” along the one route that Sherman’s men would be restricted to by adverse terrain once across the Cape Fear River. To block the narrowest point along this route the Confederates fortified three lines of defense, one behind the other, from which to oppose the Federals.

The Confederate general succeeded in delaying the Federals for an entire day and then retreated after dark from the final of the three positions. While Sherman’s men successfully seized the first two positions without heavy casualties, they were stymied by the swampy terrain fronting the third Confederate position, and unable to outflank it because of a deep ravine on one flank and deep woods on the other.

The authors point out that Hardee correctly divined Federal intentions and carefully adjusted his defense to best employ his largely untried and ill-equipped army. While I think that the author’s speculation that Hardee designed his battle plan with the Revolutionary Battle of Cowpens in mind is overemphasized, they clearly show that Averasboro was one of William Hardee’s better-fought battles. While Sherman’s armies were not seriously hurt, they were delayed long enough for Joe Johnston to organize enough of an army to attack the Federals at Bentonville as they continued to march toward Goldsboro.

In addition to their well-reasoned narrative, the authors also include a number of interesting appendixes devoted to Sherman’s logistic concept for the march through the Carolinas, the Averasboro Field Hospitals, and the experience of doctors and civilians providing medical treatment for wounded soldiers following the battle. Finally, the driving tour guide is clear and well-illustrated, permitting a complete review of the modern battlefield by both readers and the battlefield tour participants. This book is recommended to all readers interested in “Uncle Billy” Sherman, “Old Reliable” Hardee, and the Civil War in North Carolina.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

Confederate Waterloo: The Battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, and the Controversy That Brought Down a General

Having spent a career in the Army, I know the Army is not “fair”.  The Army is not “made up of people” as a former Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (1914-1974) was fond of saying.  He instead said that “It is people!”  Because it is people, it is made up of imperfect beings.  In this regard, leaders are much the same over history.  They have emotions, suffer from the same biases and prejudices as others do, and, in general, are fallible.  For this reason, “Confederate Waterloo” is an excellent study of human dynamics and leadership.  It is a well-researched work that is logically and fairly presented using the best aspects of critical thinking.  It shows that the Army is not “fair”.

Dr. Michael McCarthy has done an outstanding job of relating the sad affair regarding the relief in combat of MajGen Gouverneur K. Warren, a Union Army corps commander with a previously excellent reputation.  Reliefs of command in any circumstance are bad.  In combat, they are worse as it affects the subordinate units and the command climate.  Reliefs of bad commanders are to be celebrated.  For good commanders, reliefs are not good.  Because Warren’s relief was so controversial, it affected the U.S. Army for years after the war.  The War Between the States was close to being over so the effects were not as immediate to the Union Army but it tainted the command climate.

McCarthy does a detailed account of the Battle of Five Forks and the events leading to the demise of Warren as V Corps Commander under MG Meade.  A convoluted command system in which units were detached and attached at-will, a highly confused operational understanding by commanders attempting to use new technology to ‘command and control’ (the telegraph), and what Clausewitz calls “fog” and “friction” are proximate causes of Warren’s relief.

Warren’s performance under Army of the Potomac Commander, MajGen Meade, had been relatively good during the previous year of command.  Meade seemed pleased with V Corps’ performance.  Things took a drastic turn at Five Forks when Grant moved Warren’s V Corps and attached it to Sheridan’s command.  Sheridan was no fan of Warren.  Grant was no fan of Warren’s.  Until 1 April 1865, Meade had served as a buffer between Grant and Warren but with V Corps’ attachment to Sheridan’s command, the leadership dynamics took a radical turn for the worse.

From McCarthy’s account, it is obvious that politics and personalities played strongly into the relationships between commanders —- as is to be expected in real life.  Leadership is a human endeavor and personalities and people are the “human dimension” that defy battlefield calculus.  LtGen Grant, the overall commander on 1 April 1865, was miles from the action at Five Forks.  He was using the telegraph and developed a very imperfect understanding of the situation to try and synchronize operations.  Reflecting a situation that very much relates to current Army doctrine, a situation on the ground is best understood by the local commanders involved.  Grant failed to exercise exactly the understanding that had developed him into a higher-level commander and was “micromanaging” units without the situational understanding required.  Time-distance factors, bad weather, darkness, tired leaders, and a lack of a common situational understanding may have all contributed to the operations that evolved.  Although the Battle of Five Forks was ultimately a Union triumph, Warren was relieved by Sheridan in a preemptory and embarrassing fashion.

For years Warren attempted to seek vindication.  Those who have served in the Army know full-well that regulations and processes can be used as a weapon of retribution, or as a means to suppress anything that is disagreeable to those whose reputations are at stake.  For Grant and his protégé, Sheridan, Warren’s request for redress was successfully suppressed almost 15 years.  Finally, Warren was able to get “his day in court”.  A “Court of Inquiry” was finally convened and in proceedings similar to a modern-day courts martial, lawyers for both sides battled in a very public fray for more than a year.  Warren, who had left the service disgraced, was pitted against two of the most powerful post-war Army officers —- Grant and Sheridan.  The Army, in another attempt to suppress the less than complimentary findings of Sheridan and Grant, again “slow rolled” the results.  However, by the time the findings were made public, Warren had died, his reputation and honor still stained by his relief.

McCarthy does a great service by setting the records straight regarding General Warren.  His research is outstanding but his critical thinking is superlative.  McCarthy delves into the root causes of the issues involving personalities and provides an honest appraisal based on extensive records study and a knowledge of human nature.  This book adds much to the understanding of how leaders were motivated and acted under circumstances of stress, effects of ego, and a desire to be remembered for doing what they thought should be the historical record.

 

Reviewed by Ed Kennedy

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Volume III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign

This is the third and final volume of an exhaustively researched analysis of the Maryland (or Antietam) Campaign of the American Civil War. Originally authored by Union army officer Ezra Carman (1834-1909), the trilogy has been edited by Thomas Clemens, and enriched with bibliographical and genealogical reference material, a statistical study of casualties, a scholarly analysis of Lincoln’s decision to relieve General McClellan of his command, a summary of the entire campaign, and a good deal more. All three volumes provide very valuable details and thought-provoking interpretation and are highly recommended to Civil War students. The first two volumes are The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume I, South Mountain; The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II, Antietam.

Ezra Ayres Carman was born in Oak Tree, New Jersey, on February 27, 1834, and educated at Western Military Academy in Kentucky. He fought with New Jersey volunteers during the Civil War. Thomas G. Clemens earned his PhD at George Mason University. He has published a wide variety of magazine articles and book reviews and is a licensed tour guide at Antietam National Battlefield.

Carman accomplished what he stated as his goal – providing a running narrative that ties together the entire campaign, while not shying away from controversies. This particular volume illustrates that the battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg did not end this most important campaign: General Robert Lee led his troops back to Virginia after the stalemate in Maryland, but intended to return at Williamsport; Union General George McClellan intended to follow the Army of Northern Virginia into Virginia, but the fight at Shepherdstown changed both commanders’ plans. Carmen covers the political controversies around this campaign by utilizing the near-real time letters and messages of the participants:  for example, the telegraphic messages between Halleck and McClellan.   This third volume is a useful window into the political conflict in the east between the professional army officers (almost to a man the senior officers were conservative members of the Democratic Party) and the Republican administration which had few allies in the Potomac Army. The author and his editor give more credit to McClellan than many contemporary historians,  successfully portraying the general’s resolution in fighting Confederate forces as well as his belief that his accomplishments that lived up to his goals. The non-traditional viewpoint of McClellan’s assistance or lack thereof to General Pope in the battle of Second Bull Run should cause the reader to at least question the more common view of our times.
Interesting analysis is made concerning the interaction between McClellan, President Lincoln and Harry Halleck and why ultimately Lincoln replaced the commander on November 7th. Solid evidence is provided that shows how Union Generals Halleck, McClellan and Pope did not always work together with the best interest of President Lincoln and their soldiers. Carmen demonstrates the failure of Generals Porter and Franklin to act in conjunction with the orders of their commanding general at the battle of Second Bull Run which contributed to the utter defeat that Northern forces received from the Confederates.

I am grateful that Savas Beatie publishers has reproduced and greatly improved the original edition of the nineteenth century with the insights and corrections of the editor, himself an expert on the battle and latter part of the campaign. Carmen and Clemens provide an even handed and balanced appraisal of the campaign that has caused me to think about its importance to both war efforts in a new way. I have added this set to my list of must haves and encourage students of the war in the east to consider purchasing these books or pursuing them through the library system.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

Battle Above the Clouds: Lifting the Siege of Chattanooga and the Battle of Lookout Mountain, October 16 – November 24, 1863

This is another travel guide in the Emerging Civil War Series provided by Savas Beatie and for members of the Tennessee Valley Civil War Round Table and Civil War enthusiasts throughout the Tennessee River Valley, it close to home and follows a format similar to previous publications in the series.

David Powell provides an excellent overview of the intrigue by simply stating the personality conflicts between key leaders, both Northern and Southern, and how those rivalries may have affected the outcome of the events. He credits the Round Table’s friend and frequent speaker Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park Historian James H. Ogden III for his insight and research regarding the events surrounding Chattanooga.

For the Civil War enthusiast as well as those casually interested only because it is close to home, reading, digesting, and following the route of the events from Bridgeport, Alabama to the top of Look Out Mountain is a long day trip that will leave the traveler amazed, fully satisfied, and in awe of the challenges adversaries faced in terrain, much of which remains as it was in 1863.

The first tour is the prelude to the contested events with an adventure through the site of Wheeler’s Raid in the Sequatchie Valley beginning in Stevenson, Alabama and sites along the way, Bridgeport, Alabama, Powell’s Crossroads and Anderson’s Crossroads in Tennessee. Tour two includes Brown’s Ferry, Wauhatchie, and Lookout Mountain. There are eight maps and many photos of the leaders, monuments, and sites related to the contested area. And for those intrigued by the size and composition of military formations the author breaks down units to brigade size including their state of origin.

Not only does this particular analysis of the events provide sufficient detail for grasping the strategic and tactical implications facing the adversaries it will challenge the curious to learn more and a suggested reading list is provided.

David A. Powell met the challenge and does not disappoint any Civil War enthusiast.

 

Reviewed by Arley McCormick

Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: From Falling Waters to Culpeper Court House, July 1863

If I have ever read a “Seinfeld” history, it is this history. I am not criticizing the author, but rather observing how very little occurred over those two weeks in 1863; at least from the point of view of the Lincoln administration.  This is a well-researched and written book about “nothing.”

Jeffrey William Hunt is the Director of the Texas Military Forces Museum located in Austin, TX. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at Austin Community College, and the author of The Last Battle of the Civil War: Palmetto Ranch. Meade and Lee is the first volume of a projected three-volume set, covering the war in Central Virginia during the late summer and autumn of 1863. The other two volumes will cover the campaign of Bristoe Station and the abortive campaign of Mine Run.

This work provides a detailed account of the movements, skirmishes, and other small actions that occurred immediately after Lee’s Army had retreated across the Potomac into Virginia. Initially, General Lee rested The Army of Northern Virginia in the lower (northern) Shenandoah Valley, while General Meade’s Army crossed the Potomac into the Loudon Valley; east of the Shenandoah and separated from it by the Blue Ridge Mountains.

Jeff Hunt’s major theme of the entire series is the generalship of George Meade as an independent commander. President Lincoln expected General Meade to pursue and inflict serious damage, if not destruction, on the defeated Confederate army. Meade conformed to his orders to pursue Lee’s army, but he also conformed to earlier orders that the Federal army remain between Washington and the Confederate Army and defend against any Confederate offensive. Meade was a reluctant pursuer, very conscious of his weaknesses:  new and mediocre commanders in place of wounded Gettysburg leaders, few reinforcements and those of untried quality, no working railroad to supply his army. His caution increased when the Union cavalry was unable to penetrate the Confederate cavalry screen and identify enemy locations. Unable to learn much about Lee’s position west of the Blue Ridge, he fell prey to his wariness of Lee’s habitual audacity and the many conflicting rumors about Confederate intentions and plans. Meade spread his forces out to cover many contingencies and then shifted his men very deliberately to block the passes through the Blue Ridge, particularly Manassas Gap. When Meade finally began to concentrate his infantry Corps for a major thrust against the Gap, his lead commander was so wary of the Confederate defenders that a vastly outnumbered Confederate brigade easily parried the probe until reinforcements arrived to stalemate the situation.

Another theme of Hunt’s narrative is that the defeat at Gettysburg did not severely dispirit General Lee and his generals. They were still capable of quick decision and commendable initiative, and their rapid marches and spirited delaying actions showed the Federals that the Army of Northern Virginia remained a very formidable foe. General Lee grasped the tentative nature of Meade’s movements and then quickly moved his infantry to back-stop the cavalry and prevent Federal interference with his marching units and wagon trains.  With minimal interference and no significant delays, The Army of Northern Virginia was moved to the southern bank of the Rappahannock River, finally ending the Gettysburg Campaign not far from where it began in early June.

The author has done a fine job of analyzing these two weeks from the strategic as well as tactical perspectives. Excellent maps clearly illustrate the positions of both armies and are placed to be of real use to the reader. Contemporary sources are relied on and compared. I recommend this book to those already very well versed in Civil War history, or to readers seeking to complete one of the few remaining gaps in Gettysburg Campaign coverage.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

Lincoln’s Greatest Journey: Sixteen Days that Changed a Presidency, March 24 – April 8, 1865

This is a must-read book and a plus for a devout Lincoln follower’s library.

The author states that new learnings will arise by the reader. New in the sense that of the 16,000 volumes of Lincoln writings have not yet been presented. While this reviewer has not read all these volumes, it is apparent that the author succeeded in providing something new for this reviewer. He did so in a manner befitting great philosophers and the best of authors. He weaved a story told before with interjections of numerous small, yet significant, details not previously published. These small details evolved into a greater story that leads this reviewer to not be able to stop reading. Trudeau’s title, Lincoln’s Greatest Journey, is reminiscent of how he planned to autonomously tell this great story like never previously told.

Writings by other authors tell of Lincoln’s mental political prowess and even detailing many mundane facts in a chronological order. Detailing numerous facts in this manner leads to the reader skipping through much of previously written books and arriving at no new conclusions. Trudeau, on the other hand, interlaces personal character details and additions of period-related elements, that as chronological writing, the reader is enticed to continue reading in earnest interest. This is what this reviewer attest to: If you skip pages in this book, you might just have missed a great part of this story.

Trudeau laments on how Lincoln’s state of mind was not at its peak prior to March 24, 1865. He builds his case that Lincoln was a greater American leader because of this 16-day journey. Trudeau also draws a picture of Lincoln’s personal growth unlike any other author has done so before this writing. Trudeau accomplished this through his thorough research and event discounting old documents and previous writings.

 

Reviewed by Ricardo Jaramillo

The Lost Papers of Confederate General John Bell Hood

This book is an interesting collection of documents that were passed down through the Hood family and not made available until recently, buttressed by the author’s introduction and explanatory material between documents.  The foreword is by noted historian Richard McMurry. There are 126 primary source documents ranging from letters written by Hood as a lieutenant on the frontier to condolences written to his family after his death.  The editor/author is a distant relative of John Bell Hood who shares the nickname “Sam.”

The items of particular interest to the Civil War buff are in those chapters concerning his wounds and their treatment, the Atlanta Campaign, and the Nashville Campaign.  Much of the material was assembled by Hood from friends and subordinates for his use in writing his book, Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, which was originally published in 1880.  In many respects that book was a reply to Joe Johnston’s Narrative of Military Operations Directed during the Civil War (1874) and Sherman’s Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (1875), both of which were highly critical of Hood.  Hood solicited letters to refresh his recollections and to provide data to refute the allegations of Johnston and Sherman, while the medical reports shed new light on his mental and physical condition after his devastating wounds at Gettysburg and Chickamauga.

The chapter concerning Hood’s wounds contains the daily notes of the attending physician, Dr. Thompson Darby, and Dr. Darby’s medical reports on his condition.  Not only do these documents give a fascinating glimpse into Civil War medicine, they also decisively refute many theories concerning Hood’s physical abilities and mental sharpness.  According to the reports, Hood had significant use of his injured arm and was no longer using any pain medication by the time he returned to duty after his leg amputation.

Unfortunately, with a few exceptions the letters and documents concerning Atlanta and Nashville are of lesser interest.  All these were written well before the Official Records were issued, so they address opinions and controversies that, in the main, were resolved when these records were published.  Yes, Johnston understated his strength and his casualties in his book, although not quite to the extent Hood alleged.  Hood excused his failure at Cassville by quoting a Union report (included) that documented two Union regiments  (less than 1,000 men) were threatening the rear of his 20,000 man corps—not particularly convincing.  These letters and documents do not address the period when Hood had overall command around Atlanta, but pick up again after its fall and address the Nashville Campaign.  The most interesting new information in this whole section is relayed in a letter written in 1875 from S. D. Lee to Hood, alleging that A. P. Stewart told him Cleburne was overcome by remorse concerning the failure at Spring Hill and hinting that Cleburne pressed the attack at Franklin suicidally because of this.  This second-hand opinion is interesting, although a close reading of the Spring Hill engagement would suggest the primary fault lay first with Brown and then with Cheatham.

To understand many of the points raised in the various letters (and the point of view of the letter writers, both Hood and the others) requires a fairly detailed knowledge of the campaigns and the personalities involved.  For instance, the average reader could hardly be expected to understand why Francis Shoup was supportive of Hood and dismissive of Johnston, while A. P. Stewart inclined to supporting Johnston’s positions over Hood’s.  Some of the author’s notes allude to a few of the issues but not to all.  All in all, this is a book directed more to specialists rather than the general run of Civil War buff, yet it contains interesting sidelights and insight into Hood’s character as well as documenting some of the sources Hood used for his book.

 

Reviewed by John Scales

The Gettysburg Cyclorama: The Turning Point of the Civil War on Canvas

When first I saw the surviving copy of The Battle of Gettysburg, commonly known as the Gettysburg Cyclorama, it was a disappointment; the enormous (40 by 400 feet, weighing about six tons) painting of the Picket’s Charge defeat was poorly displayed in a cramped and ill-lit building; the painting itself was so dingy and sagging that it actually contributed little to my Gettysburg experience. Yet in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, many visitors to the four traveling exhibits of the Gettysburg Cyclorama had marveled at French painter Paul Philippoteaux’s artistic achievement; for generations of Americans it was easily the most recognized artistic representation of the battle.

Since 2008 visitors to the battlefield benefit enjoy a much better experience, for the repaired and re-stored Gettysburg Cyclorama painting has been housed in a magnificent building on the battlefield, very close to the ‘High-Water Mark of the Confederacy.’ The significant upgrade to the painting and facility inspired Registered Gettysburg Battlefield Guides Chris Brenneman and Sue Boardman, assisted by photographer Bill Dowling, to create this extremely interesting study of the creation and exhibition of the Cyclorama, as well as its restoration and display at Gettysburg.

The book begins with an explanation for the development of Cycloramas, used to illustrate great battles or events in Europe and America. The authors then provide a behind-the-scenes review of the motivation for Philippoteaux, a very famous cyclorama painter, being commissioned as chief artist to create four massive Gettysburg paintings. Also detiled are the  marketing and exhibiting strategies followed by entrepreneur Charles Willoughby, as he coordinated the display of these paintings throughout the nation up to the early twentieth century. Some detective work was required to finally identify which of the copies was finally permanently emplaced at Gettysburg in 1913.

Ms. Boardman explains the techniques employed when drawing, painting and hanging such a large canvas. The team of artists used specially commissioned landscape photographs by William Tipton to orient themselves to the battlefield from the perspective of the famous Copse of Trees, chosen focal point for the painting. Senior Federal officers such as Winfield Hancock, Abner Doubleday, and Alexander Webb were consulted for details of the battlefield events.  The artists inspected Civil War artifacts to correctly portray the uniforms, weapons, wagons of the battle (there are a number of inaccuracies; only one type of cannon is portrayed in all of the batteries, and some soldiers are wearing uniforms that look suspiciously like French Army uniforms of the eighteen-eighties). Many corrections were made to the Cycloramas over the years, some as a result of the complaints of veterans viewing the exhibit, and some to add to local interest in a particular exhibition (Eg., some changes were made during a Boston exhibit to highlight Massachusetts officers portrayed in the painting).

The National Park Service “Mission 66” initiative, to provide a new building for the cyclorama, and the successful work of Olin Conservation, Inc. to painstakingly clean, restore/repair, and rehang the cyclorama is a fascinating part of the book. Yet the highlight of the book for me are the ten chapters devoted to scene by scene explanation of the events portrayed in the cyclorama, highlighting the personalities, buildings, units, equipment and terrain features of The Battle of Gettysburg.

The brilliant work of Philippoteaux’s team and the Olin renovators is lovingly illustrated with high-quality photos and thorough explanations. While the cyclorama is not a perfectly accurate portrayal of the fighting at Bloody Angle, this book is a marvelous review of a great work of art that has entered the fundamental layer of the public’s knowledge of the Battle of Gettysburg. I strongly recommend it to you.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

Fight Like the Devil: The First Day at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863

The first day of the Battle of Gettysburg is sometimes overlooked by students of the battle, dismissed as a mere prelude to the more significant combat taking place on 2d and 3d July, 1863. Many casual students of the battle recall the first day for the “missed opportunity” when the Confederate Army failed to seize Culps and Cemetery Hills at the end of the day. This failure permitted the Federal Army to rally on this commanding ground, then fortify and reinforce the terrain to anchor their defensive line for the next two days of battle.

The authors argue that the first day’s fight deserves greater attention from the Civil War students, and have written a provocative if brief history and driving-tour guide to assist visitors better understand the significance of the fighting north and west of Gettysburg town.

Part of the successful Emerging Civil War series, this book is the first of at least three that Savas Beatie will publish on the Battle of Gettysburg. The authors are all former or current National Park historians and together have published over a dozen books on Civil War topics.

After a short review of the Confederate invasion and the Federal countermoves, the narrative chronologically reviews the first day’s events, completing each episode with a ‘Stop;’ generally a statue or battlefield marker. These dismount points are provided with GPS coordinates, and the text orients the reader to the ground, as an aid in better understanding the importance of the terrain to the event.

The authors contradict two of the ‘myths’ of the Battle of Gettysburg, devoting space in the main narrative and in more detailed appendices:  That Gettysburg contained large supplies of shoes, and that Stonewall Jackson could have and would have seized the high ground south of Gettysburg, had he been spared to command his troops that day.

For me those appendixes, and several others written by noted experts such as Eric Wittenberg, are the most interesting parts of the book. One appendix re-considers the ability of Federal General John Reynolds (who was killed during the first day’s battle and is often given credit for choosing Gettysburg as a battleground). Another explains the significance of General George Meade’s “Pipe Creek” memorandum, and still another explains just what happened in the course of General Stuart’s ride around the Federal Army and why Stuart’s absence disabled General Lee’s campaign plan.

The authors pack a great deal of information into this small book. The maps are very well done and will add considerably to understanding unit movements. It is a good beginner’s guide to the battle.

 

Reviewed by David Lady

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