

Tennessee Valley Civil War Round Table November 2018 Newsletter



To Inform and Educate Since 1993 Contents

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Questions/Comments: Newsletter Editor; Arley McCormick



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Your TVCWRT Board recommends Ms. April Harris as the President of the Tennessee Valley Civil War Round Table.

April is a member of the Round Table and has extensive experience in the Academic field. She worked for four universities, Bowling Green State University, Baylor College of Medicine, Utah State University, and now, she is currently the Associate Vice President, University Events at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. Her responsibility includes organizing the president's events, academic ceremonies, and protocol.

April joined the UAH staff in 1999 as the Executive Director of the UAH Alumni Association until her promotion in 2009. She is well acquainted with academic traditions and authored three books; *Special Events Planning for Success, Etiquette and Protocol, A Guide for Campus Events and Academic Ceremonies, and A Handbook of Traditions and Protocol.*

April is the winner of the Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE); Ashmore Award for Distinguished Service to the Advancement Profession, A CASE Apple for teaching, she is a former member of the CASE Commission on Alumni Relations and the CASE District III Board of Directors. She is a past president of the North American Association of Commencement Officers (NAACO) and the National Educational Alumni Trust (NEAT).

Ms. Harris is a journalism/public relations graduate of Bowling Green State University and also earned a certificate at the Protocol School of Washington. She is also a member of Protocol and Diplomacy International-Protocol Officers Association.

A call for additional nominations and a vote for election by RT members present will be held at the November 8 general meeting.

Arley McCormick
Newsletter Editor



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A note from the Treasurer; Beth Altenkirch

October was filled with meaningful events for the Round Table. Sadly, we remembered our late president, David Lady, at a service at the Redstone Arsenal. Energized by his spirit we marched forward with an outstanding program with Gregg Biggs speaking on the Civil War logistics organized by General Sherman in preparation and execution of the Atlanta Campaign.

Twenty hardy souls trekked off to Mississippi with guide, John Scales, to follow the trail and study the tactics Nathan Bedford Forest employed to defend the Prairie Region of Mississippi. Members of the Round Table also added ambience to the productions of the Huntsville Ballet's "The Letter" by dressing in period garb and greeting guests. Round Table members also strolled the streets of old Madison with the Volksmarching Club to add focus on Civil War skirmishes that enveloped their depot and Indian Creek.

And here we are, in a new fiscal year looking forward to another outstanding year of Round Table activities and programs. The board has put together an ambitious budget for the coming year, anticipating growing membership and their active support for the Round Table mission. The budget is partly based upon the confidence that a number of members will step up and purchase a leadership membership of \$100. This will speak volumes about your commitment to this outstanding Round Table, and it will cement our goals of again bringing outstanding speakers and programs to the Tennessee Valley.

Take a look at the Membership fee changes. \$30 remains the basic membership fee for the household of 2 but, there is greater opportunity to help the Round Table sustain the quality speakers over the course of the year. Supporting Member \$100; Sustaining \$250; Patron \$500 and an unspecified contribution. See Kevin for details and benefits of each category.

Beth Altenkirch
TVCWRT
Treasurer



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ANNOUNCEMENTS;



Janet E. Croon

Thursday, November 8, Janet E. Croon will address her new and only book, *The War Outside My Window, The Civil War Diary of LeRoy Wiley Gresham 1860-1865*. (See John Scales Book Review in this Newsletter). LeRoy Cresham was born in 1847 to an affluent and prominent slaveholding family in Macon, Georgia. As a child his leg was crushed by a falling chimney that also injured his back leaving him an invalid. His health deteriorated steadily and when the Civil War erupted in 1860 he maintained a diary describing the events as they unfolded with the eyes and the intellect far exceeding that of a normal teenager. In addition (See Arley McCormick's book review *I Am Perhaps Dying* by Dr. Dennis Rashbach's in this Newsletter.) Dr. Rashbach writes an in-depth investigative report on the medical field, training, diagnoses, and remedies, regarding LeRoy Wiley Gresham's condition based upon his diary concluding he died of Tuberculosis. The evening is sure to be another great adventure.

Janet E. Croon hold a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science, Modern European History, and Russian Language and Area Studies from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1983), and A Master's Degree in International Studies from the University of Dayton (1885). She taught International Baccalaureate History for nearly two decades for Fairfax County Public Schools and developed a deep interest in the Civil War while living in northern Virginia.

LET'S VISIT NICK'S RISTORANTE



Our friend Nick of Nick's Restaurante
our October meeting?

Nick's
Ristorante
remains
the #1
steakhouse
in North



East Alabama and now has
the Best Chef in the Valley as
voted in The Planet.

Who is this smiling member
that gets to eat at Nicks with
the gift certificate he won at



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We Thank, Homewood Suites by Hilton, (714 Gallatin Street SW Huntsville) for their support for the Round Table.

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If You order ANYTHING
Through Amazon

PLEASE ORDER THRU
SMILE.AMAZON.COM &
CHOOSE TVCWRT AS YOUR
CHARITY RECIPIANT

In the event a scheduled meeting must be canceled, visit the website www.tvcwrt.org for a detailed



update no later than 3:00 P.M. on the day of the meeting.

A cancelation will only be for weather or if the Elks Lodge has an unexpected facility issue that requires closure. The board will not attempt to contact members.

papers

Board Reports

Preservation Update; by Carol Codori, former President of the TVCWRT

“Are we there yet?” Well, I think; Yes!



Downtown has a new Civil War-era landmark! In September, several RT members helped with sunken sidewalk preservation, at 205 Eastside Square. Handmade bricks from the late 1860s are now visible several feet below the new metal work and clear covering. Permanent signage, ribbon cutting, and regular maintenance will follow as part of Alabama's 2019 Bicentennial.

Donations or inquiries c/o carolcodori@att.net

Carol says,
"take a look at
the brick!"

Board Reports

Programs; 13 December 2018 Special Presentation; Alann Schmidt is the co- other of September Morn and a native Huntsvillian. He will speak on the Dunker Church and the battle of Antietam.




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The Membership; submitted by Membership Chair, Kevin Rodriguez; our membership stands at 133 including families and students. Renew your membership and recruit new members begins now.


TVCWRT Features Book Reviews

The War Outside My Window. Edited by Janet Elizabeth Croom. Savas Beatie, 2018, 418 pages. Review by former President, John Scales



The War Outside My Window is a very interesting and entertaining find, a diary written by a teenage boy who lived in Macon, Georgia during the Civil War and son of very wealthy parents, LeRoy Wiley Gresham was bright, perceptive, and mature well beyond his years. He also had been crippled by a falling chimney – and was slowly dying due to tuberculosis. Unaware until near the end that he is under a death sentence, LeRoy recounts in detail local and national events, exhibiting an increasing awareness not only of the war but of the unreliability of the news. He also documents the various treatments he underwent and the pain he endured, but his optimistic nature and lively interest in his surroundings as well as his religious faith shine through. Many interesting details from the daily weather and details of his life to incidents of houses burning (apparently there were arsonists at large) and deaths due to illness are documented in the diary. The diary ends a few days before his death, which occurred on June 18th, 1865, almost simultaneous with the death of the Confederacy.

The editor has done a fantastic job not only merely transcribing LeRoy's



notes but, with liberal use of footnotes, painting the real events that underlay the news in those notes. The result is a fascinating window into a lost era. I highly recommend this book, particularly to those seeking insight into the “home front” of the war.

I Am Perhaps Dying by Dennis Rasbach, MD, FACS, *The Medical Backstory of Spinal Tuberculosis Hidden in the Civil War Diary of LeRoy Wiley Gresham*, Savas Beatie, 109 pages, Reviewed by Arley McCormick.

Dr. Rasbach, takes us on a trip, not only regarding the life and diary of LeRoy Wiley Gresham, but the nature of medicine in the 19th



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Century and particularly during the Civil War years. His investigation into the life of LeRoy Wiley Gresham is an assessment of the medical profession. He defines symptoms, clues from the medicines prescribed to young Gresham and the physical treatments recommended to make a clear picture of the state of medical diagnoses and treatment during the era. Tuberculosis in the 19th Century was the primary killer of young adults, particularly those in major population centers.

Medical care during the Civil War was primitive by today's standards and administered in the absence of the knowledge of the transmission of disease and infection by organism's unseen. Add the threats to health by war and famine, the brief period of medical education and training potential doctors needed to earn the title Doctor, and it is easy to understand the call for a doctor was, on many an occasion, a call that ended badly.

Dr. Rasbach, analyzed every one of LeRoy Wiley Gresham's diary entries that referred to his condition and pieced together the clues regarding that grisly condition that plagued the 19th Century. Home remedies recommended to ease the suffering and mask the pain explained the inevitable outcome. The Doctors analysis is not written in Doctor language but rather in a fashion that a layperson can understand and will appreciate the state of medicine in the 19th Century and the unfortunate life of the Gresham teenager. It's an interesting and worthwhile read.

Proof of Russian Collusion! The U.S. President is Guilty!

By Ms. Shirly I. Williams TVCWRT Member

A statue of Abraham Lincoln stands at a museum on Bolshaya Pirogovskaya Street in downtown Moscow, Russia. He is not alone; Czar Alexander II is shaking his hand.



Church of Our Savior on the Spilled Blood

During a trip to St. Petersburg in 2005, where I visited the Church of Our Savior on the Spilled Blood, I initiated a quest to satisfy my curiosity about Czar Alexander II. The name of the church is significant because it was built on the location where Alexander was governing during the same time frame as

Lincoln. I wondered what their connections or relationship might have been



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since there were obvious comparisons between their philosophy regarding human bondage and both were murdered by opposing political radicals.

I found that, indeed, the two men corresponded. There were other similarities regarding privately owned large landholdings, a need for inexpensive labor to provide production as the industrial capacity grew to accommodate many inventions dependent upon the use of steam power, threats that England and France may support the Confederacy and blockade the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, expansion of pioneers into the Pacific northwest, gold seekers toward Alaska, and, certainly, the Emancipation Proclamation signed by Lincoln “The Great Emancipator” correlated with the Czar, “The Great Liberator” freeing Russian serfs. These heads of state had much in common even in their last days and made similar comments regarding how tired they were fighting for their causes and the struggle it had become.

Evidence of the friendship between the two rulers was never stronger than at



Lincoln couldn't escape the press and their mocking satire.

where southern battleships could be prevented from bombarding the Union facilities. (The confederate ship Savannah was positioned in the Pacific and was considered a formidable threat.)

Lincoln hoped to blockade any English and French ships from entering southern ports and prevent any Confederate ships from transporting goods or material. His navy at the time was a total of 45 commissioned ships with others under repair or construction. In addition to the blockade, Union vessels were to, “*enter into combat with Confederate vessels, carry the war to places in the*

the outbreak of the Civil War. Alexander expressed his alarm that the new nation, after so much progress, should now be torn and battered by war. He announced that Russia was in support of the Union. While England and France were debating their position relative to alliances (1863), Alexander withdrew some Baltic Fleet ships from Europe and sent them to New York Harbor where they could patrol the ports along the east coast of the U.S. and he sent the Russian Far East Fleet to the port of San Francisco



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
seceded states that were inaccessible to union troops, but could be reached by water, and support the army by providing gunfire support, rapid transport and communications on the rivers of the interior". This was a tall order for such a small Navy. The Russian vessels were a huge asset and accompanied by the previous stance taken by the Russian government (1862 the Russian pledge, to "never move against the U.S. and to oppose any attempt by others to do so", further stated, "You know the sentiments of Russia. We desire above all things the maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation. We cannot take any part, more than we have done. We have no hostility to the Southern people. Russia has declared her position and will maintain it." As the Russian admirals



Czar Alexander II of Russia

had been told, *"if the U.S. and Russia were to find themselves at war with Britain and France, the Russian ships should place themselves under Lincoln's command and operate in synergy with the U.S. Navy Secretary. Gideon Welles stated, "God Bless the Russians".*

In addition to, the territory of Alaska "Seward's Folly", the



President Abraham Lincoln

establishment of the small museum in the heart of Moscow includes two pens that lie side by side, used to sign their declarations, are reminders of the two men who came from such different origins but held similar worthwhile concerns and worked together toward a better place in history for their people.

When I learned of the opening of the museum in 2011, I felt a personal sense of closure to the story of President Lincoln and Czar Alexander II. The celebration of Alexander's freeing the serfs on the anniversary March 3, 1861 and the American corollary of President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 giving credence that it was certainly appropriate to have Lincoln's presence felt there as well. Their letters of correspondence were signed, *"your affectionate friend"*, I wonder if others have ever been prompted to say, as they view the two friends each grasping the others hand, *"truly and finally well met!"*



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Nooks and Crannies; American Military Thought in 1860; Part 2: Application; (Driving Strategies)

American generals of 1861, facing a military problem as vast as Napoleon's invasion of Russia, studied Jomini in the misguided faith that they were studying Napoleon. They marched against strategic points – Corinth, Richmond, Atlanta – content to let Confederate armies escape to fight again, so long as they could occupy this real estate. And so the war worried on, until other commanders emerged, possessing the true, brutally clear Napoleonic appreciation.

John R. Elting, "Jomini, Disciple of Napoleon?", Military Affairs 23 (Spring 1964), 17-26.

Last month, in Part 1, we looked at how French doctrine, derived from Napoleonic warfare as interpreted and codified by Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini, mixed with the army's own challenges and experience after the War of 1812 formed the foundation of the nation's military thought as we entered the Civil War. Here we will focus on the factors and considerations that went into the initial set of strategies on both sides. Strategy is dynamic, continually adjusting to changing circumstances and situations. We do not have space here to detail how Union and Southern military strategies evolved across the theaters and what drove their evolution as the war progressed. We will deal with that in Part 3, building it into various articles about specific campaigns and battles.

Part 1 focused on the military theories of Jomini. We mentioned only in passing the other great 19th century military theorist, Count Carl von Clausewitz. While a contemporary of Jomini, Clausewitz was not well known in the US and had little direct impact on our military thinking. His signature work, the three-volume *On War*, wasn't even translated into English until 1874¹, and it was the 1960s before he finally achieved the widespread standing in the US and around the world that he enjoys today. Still, I will relate strategic thinking North and South to his concepts. While we did not think of or refer to him directly during the Civil War, today we can interpret and better understand events in his context.

First, A Bit More Theory (Definitions)

One of Clausewitz's most famous dictums is that **war is a political act** used to achieve critical **national policy** goals sought by governments in arms.² These



War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means.



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goals are sometimes referred to as **primary political aims** or **war aims**. This is the top rung of strategy formulation.

When speaking of national policy and goals, we should also think in terms of needs and focus. Neither side wanted armed conflict, but neither Lincoln nor Davis was willing to back down from his central focus. The South's core political goal was independence from the North; it wanted to be out from under what it generally perceived to be northern political suppression and manipulation; it wanted freedom to establish and follow policies it thought best in its long-term interests.³ The secessionist states made the decision to leave the Union, and Davis as the Confederacy's leader was willing to go to war to safeguard that end. He had wide backing across the Confederacy.⁴ On the other hand, the Union's core political goal, as conceived and pursued by Lincoln despite considerable political dissent, was maintenance of the Union in perpetuity. He was willing to go to great lengths (political concessions) to keep the South in the Union peacefully but would use military force to do so if necessary. His mindset was crystal towards the end of his first inaugural address, "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.'"

The manner in which governments seek to fulfill their national policy goals is the grist of **grand strategy**: the bringing together of all national tools and capabilities – military, economic, national, social, cultural, and diplomatic – to achieve national objectives. These are the elements of grand strategy – the sum total national power.

Diplomacy was a particularly critical component of grand strategy for both sides in the Civil War, particularly the diplomatic relationships that were attempted and realized between the Confederacy and Great Britain, and the Union and Great Britain (and, to a lesser extent, between both and France). Understanding the British connection is critical to understanding how the Civil War played out on the world stage.⁵ Southern attempts to achieve recognition by Great Britain as a sovereign power were vital to achieving their goal of national identity and sovereignty. They never achieved it.

Today, warfare is divided into three levels: **strategic**, **operational**, and **tactical**. These divisions weren't as defined or distinct during the Civil War as they are today, but they provide a useful way to categorize and describe war activities.

Strategy (derived from the Greek word meaning *generalship*) is the broad application of military force as an element of a nation's grand strategy to achieve its national policy objectives. The US Army today defines *strategy* as the relationship among ends, means, and ways. *Ends* are the objectives or



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goals sought, *means* are the resources available to pursue the objectives, and *ways* are how one organizes and applies the resources. Each of these components suggests a related question. What do we want to pursue (*ends*)? With what (*means*)? How (*ways*)? In the Civil War, this included, for example, implementing economic blockades, use of attrition warfare (to wear the enemy down), and coordination of major military operations to force the enemy to your will.

Means are more than materiel and human resources; they include *leadership* and *cost*. Leadership is a factor that affects all levels. A good plan is for naught if those responsible are not capable of implementing it; a poor plan may still work if strong leadership is pursuing it. Include in this *personality* and *attitude* in addition to *competence*. Davis, for example, would have preferred a field command. His sense of duty drove him to accept the position of President of the Confederacy instead, but it didn't prevent him from (over)emphasizing his commander-in-chief role, which manifested itself in his micro-management of field activities throughout the war. And then there's not only the cost in lives, misery, and physical devastation (which came to be enormous in the South), but the dollars and cents cost of prosecuting the war. Probably little consideration was given in this regard in the beginning since both sides expected (desires distorting probabilities?) a short conflict, but certainly became a factor as the conflict intensified.⁶ The take-away here is how components of strategy formulation can and will change over time.



If the leader is filled with high ambition and ... pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles.

Union and Southern naval strategies were critical to each side's prosecution of the war. Coastal and river operations were in effect a bridge between blue water and land operations.* We will touch on them in Part 3, but for now I'll defer discussion of blue water activities to Kent Wright.

** Kent is deep into this field, covering it in detail in presentations and in much-anticipated publishable written materials. His handling of this topic – its role and importance overall – is substantive and eye opening.*

Lying between the strategic and tactical levels, **operations** are the movement and employment of one's forces to bring the enemy to combat or to otherwise achieve strategic goals. At this level, campaigns and major operations are planned and conducted to accomplish strategic goals within theaters of operations. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they orchestrate tactical successes to achieve objectives at higher levels. Planning at the operational level of war determines *what* we will affect,




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with *what* courses of action, in *what* order, for *what* duration, and with *what* resources.

The **tactical** level of war is where individual battles and engagements are fought. While resulting effects may be described as operational or strategic, military actions occur almost entirely at the tactical level.

Now, Some Applications (The Curtain Rises)

And so, it came to be – open military conflict on a scale hitherto unknown in the Americas. The South’s war aim was to achieve its goal of independence.




Let them smell Southern powder and feel Southern steel!

To do this, the South had “only” to survive as a coherent political unit until the North acquiesced to its secession. The North’s war aim was to maintain the Union. To do this it had to defeat (to conquer) the South. The military analyst of the *Times* of London offered the following comments early in the war: “...It is one thing to drive the rebels from the south bank of the Potomac, or even to occupy Richmond, but another to reduce and hold in permanent subjection a tract of country nearly as large as Russia in Europe. . . No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except

where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case. . . Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South...”⁷ This was the canvas upon with each side’s efforts played out.

Was either side – their political or military institutions and leaders, their populations – ready for it? In a word, No. While there were individual exceptions (Scott and Sherman, for example), neither side expected a long war. Neither had allies that could help support it in the conflict that lay ahead. Few on either side envisioned the length and kind of conflict awaiting them, or the economic and diplomatic ramifications.⁸ They truly were stepping into the belly of the beast.



Cotton is a global commodity

The South’s grand strategy revolved around the need to survive as a viable political entity and to achieve the standing of a sovereign power. It could do this only if it could withstand the military challenges of opposing nations. International recognition-- principally from Great Britain and France – would validate this, along with the expectation that economic and military assistance would follow. Davis believed that British

recognition alone would discourage the North from prosecuting the war and



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that the Union would withdraw from the fight from a fear of British intervention. To facilitate this, Davis also planned to leverage British demand for US (Southern) cotton, believing (correctly, near-term) its economy would be hurt without it. Unfortunately for the South, Britain also relied on Union grain and found alternative sources for cotton to support its fabric industries (Egypt, Brazil, India, and the West Indies).⁹ Southern diplomacy would also downplay slavery. Seward assured the British and the French that if provoked the US would go to war with them.¹⁰ Great Britain came close to diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy, but never quite got there.¹¹

In the meantime, the South also wanted to maintain international trade to obtain war materiel and other necessary resources, as well as have open sea lines of commerce for its exports. This meant keeping ports open and functioning. It needed to increase industrial capacity to support the war effort. It started the war with almost no modern weaponry sufficient for battlefield use; those that it had had been taken from federal arsenals. It also wanted to extend control into the New Mexico Territories (comprising today's New Mexico, Arizona, and southern Nevada) and on into Colorado and southern California. It wanted the mineral resources throughout the region (as well as to deny them to the North), along with access to Pacific shipping routes in California. A sideshow, but one that had significant potential impact.



Once the shooting started, the North's war aim was to maintain the Union by quelling armed resistance as quickly and with as few casualties and collateral damage as possible. In every sense this included thwarting the South's grand strategy. As time went on and the South's challenge became clearer, maintaining the Union meant decisively defeating (conquering) the South. How this would be accomplished (the military strategy) would also evolve from an overall Jominian approach of capturing terrain and facilities (e.g., Corinth, Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Atlanta) to a more classic Napoleonic (Clausewitzian) approach of destroying the enemy army and its means to resist (e.g., Vicksburg, Sherman's March, and the Overland Campaign – and, of course, Lincoln's blockade).

The region of decisive operations encompassed the country from the Atlantic coastal zone to the Mississippi River basin. The area was unequally divided by the looming barrier of the Appalachian Mountains, as much as two hundred miles wide in places, over which communication was difficult. At points, the eastern section of the country beyond the range was two hundred miles wide and the western section about three hundred miles wide. In Maryland, northwestern Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri sentiment was divided between



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the Union and the Confederacy. The Mississippi River separated three of the seceding States (and one border state) from the remaining eight.

This broad topography added a scale of action surpassing the Revolution and the Mexican War. It lent itself to three defined theaters on land in the South and the border states: Eastern (mid-Appalachian Range to the Atlantic, with the range mid-line extending south through Georgia and Florida to the Gulf of Mexico), Western (mid-Appalachian Range to the Mississippi River), and the Trans-Mississippi (everything west of the Mississippi).¹² The Union and Confederacy also divided itself into various military districts -- a command and control measure already in use in the Union. The theaters remained throughout the war; the military districts changed constantly as the situation demanded.

At the outset, the South pursued a forward defense posture (*defend everything*) with a so-called *offensive-defensive* strategy (assume a defensive posture and await Union advances while seeking opportunities to initiate offensive action). Punish the invader, discourage future attacks, and convince the Union public that future attacks would be futile, and the military efforts conquer the Confederate states would fail. This was classic Jomini describing a nation forced into a defensive position.¹³ This led to small armies being dispersed around the Confederate perimeter along the Arkansas-Missouri border, at several points on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, along the Tennessee-Kentucky border, and in the Shenandoah Valley and western Virginia as well as at Manassas. This spread the Confederate army so thin that Union forces could easily break through somewhere, which they did at several points in 1862.

In the event, the Army of Northern Virginia (AoNV) and the Army of Tennessee were much more aggressive than this implies.¹⁴ They didn't raid and counter-attack just to defeat their opponents on the battlefield, they initiated offensive campaigns designed to disrupt and destroy the enemy in a decisive battle(s), seize strategic targets (e.g., Nashville), and influence foreign and Northern public opinion (e.g., Gettysburg). On the scale they approached this, it proved their undoing.¹⁵

Each side, particularly the Confederates, used *interior lines* to move forces from quiet fronts through the interior to threatened fronts more quickly than the enemy could move around the military border. In practice, though, Southern supply lines were insufficient to the task; despite longer distances, Union forces often moved in shorter time due to their superior lateral communications. In each case the use of rivers, railroads and the telegraph were critical.¹⁶ In this regard, Grant's coordinated strategy proved decisive in 1864-65. He concentrated Union forces for simultaneous advances in the Eastern and Western Theaters to pin and defeat Confederate troops on all major fronts. To use Clausewitzian monikers:¹⁷ ***concentration of forces in***




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space (the use of mass) to counteract the South's use of interior lines, and **unification (concentration) of forces in time** (the use of maneuver) for simultaneous advances, which had the intrinsic advantage of acting as a force multiplier.¹⁸ The South had no coherent defensive strategy between its field armies and theaters to counter this. Given the manpower and materiel imbalances, this flaw proved fatal.

Until Grant took command, the South could count on reprieves during periods of Union inactivity (including winter stand downs) to refit and restore their logistic and supply bases. Grant's **operational tempo** bankrupted Lee and other Southern generals of their supplies, morale and manpower, and their ability to concentrate against one army while delaying or holding against another. Grant used maneuver to increase tempo as well as to place his forces advantageously. Indeed, Grant's use of maneuver was every bit as important to his generalship as it was to those given more credit for using maneuver – Lee and Jackson, Sherman and Sheridan.¹⁹ Grant believed that strategic concepts were nothing more than common sense, claiming "the art of war is simple enough: find out where the enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on. (Sounds much like Forrest!)

Other critical elements of Southern strategy included enticing the border states to secede – particularly Kentucky and Missouri (Maryland and Delaware were geographically more problematic), maintain the integrity of the Mississippi River (maintain physical connection with states west of the river), and make the war as costly to the Union as possible so as to stimulate and capitalize on Union war weariness.

Northern strategy included pressing on all fronts, leveraging the South's limited resources and causing it to overextend; seize




1861 Cartoon of the Union
Blockade of the South during the
Civil War

critical areas, including Richmond, agricultural and mineral production areas, and the Mississippi River; and wear the South out and suffocate it.

Key elements of this strategy were the blockade of Southern ports and retention of border states in the Union. Retention of Maryland and Delaware was a foregone conclusion. Lincoln simply wasn't going to give up his capital, Washington, DC. More Jominian thinking, but in this case apropos. Kentucky was just as important and came to be a Confederate target, but in the end it stayed in the Union. The North simply could not give it up.²⁰

Squeezing the South included a blockade of major



*I hope to have
God on my side,
but I must have
Kentucky!*




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ports. The press at the time labeled it General Scott's Anaconda Plan, and so it has come down to us in popular histories. In the event, he wasn't the originator. Scott described the concept in his May 6, 1861 letter to McClellan and briefed the cabinet on June 29, but Lincoln had already proclaimed the blockade. As described in Wikipedia, Secretary of State William Henry Seward recommended adopting a blockade shortly after the Battle of Fort Sumter. Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, argued for a de facto but undeclared blockade, which would prevent foreign governments from granting the Confederacy belligerent status. President Abraham Lincoln sided with Seward and proclaimed the blockade on April 19. He extended it to include North Carolina and Virginia on April 27. Lincoln's blockade initially was more paper than substance due to size limitations of the Navy, but the policy was put into place. While the idea may have been picked up by Scott in his thinking and subsequently fleshed out and managed by the Navy's Blockade Board (established June 25, 1861), Lincoln was its father. By July (at least partly in response to the outcome of the First Battle of Bull Run²¹), the Union Navy had established blockades of all the major Southern ports. Great Britain grappled with the legality of blockade, but did not grant the South belligerent status, which in essence would have meant formal recognition of the Confederacy.*²²

** Kent Wright has done a prodigious amount of research in this area. His conclusions regarding Confederate privateers, unleashed by Jefferson Davis immediately following Ft Sumter, are particularly fascinating. Reliance on privateers as an immediate action force constitutes what today we would label asymmetric warfare.*

Let's touch again on leadership– the selection of senior generals and field commanders – as a factor in developing strategy. Davis relied on past relationships, apparently looking for those with whom he could work well. This makes sense until you take in Davis' penchant for micromanaging field strategy and operations. His choice of Lee and Cooper (a general all but invisible in popular histories) were fortuitous, but his other selections were fraught with problems, never to be fully resolved. Lincoln would hire and



fire regularly while looking for the winning number. He finally found it in Grant (and his posse Sherman, Sheridan, and others). There were good field generals on each side, to be sure (e.g., Jackson, Stuart, Forrest, and Hardee for the South; Thomas, Reynolds, and Meade for the North), but Lee and Grant became the center of action.²³



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** Another aspect Part 3 is going to look at generalship – what it took to be a good general, how senior generals were selected, and so forth. For now, we’ll settle for the idea that leadership is a necessary factor in strategy development and in operational application.*

Another key Clausewitzian concept is **center of gravity**. Today’s Army sees the enemy’s center of gravity as his “source of strength” – capabilities-based rather than, as Clausewitz seems to hold, effects-based.²⁴ Jomini defined a decisive point as anything “whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy”.²⁵ The difference is crucial given the situation of its use. I hold that either can be the case. It depends on the situation. Think of a foe’s center of gravity at any given level of warfare as its Achilles heel: find and exploit it, and the enemy flounders.



To achieve victory, we must mass our forces at the hub of all power & movement. The enemy's 'Center of Gravity'.

Davis’ *defend everything* strategy presumed that South’s critical mass to be a combination of its political integrity, the individual states, and protection of resources. We’ve discussed the political integrity issue. To be a sovereign nation, you must be in control. As to the individual states, Davis had a Congress and 11 individual state governors with which to contend. How could he pull defense back from the Confederacy’s borders for the sake of establishing a more coherent defense and thereby sacrifice all or part of some of these states to the forces of the Union? How would that play with the Secessionist’s states’ rights meme? The imbalance of resources – human, natural, and materiel – vis-à-vis the Union is well known. Again, how could he sacrifice any of these without a fight? National integrity, the individual states, the availability of/access to resources, of which human resources were primary – all drove the South to a forward defense strategy. Moreover, the imbalance meant the South had to win in the first year or two – it simply didn’t have the legs for a long fight.²⁶ It also appears that Davis overestimated his ability to shift forces to counter a thrust.

The North’s center of gravity was public opinion. The South didn’t need to defeat Union military forces or occupy Union territory for purely military purposes per se, but for political purposes – to facilitate Northern war weariness. There was a wide-spread, well organized political resistance to armed conflict with the South. The plight of the slaves didn’t move many (albeit public opinion in this regard increasingly shifted toward abolition as the war went on). Many were for simply letting the Southern states secede, and good riddance! This resistance was exacerbated in the early years of the war by the Confederate Army victories, particularly in the East. If the Confederacy was going to break Northern will to fight, it had to do so quickly. The greater



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the cost in terms of blood and treasure to the North, the greater the chance the North might opt for peace. On the battlefield time started to run out for the South by mid-1863 (Vicksburg and Gettysburg); politically, time ran out in November 1864. Political opposition peaked going into 1864 when Lincoln ran against the Democrat McClellan. With his reelection, the outcome of the war was decided. Unfortunately, too many in the Confederate leadership decided to keep fighting even though there was no chance at that point of reconciliation. The remainder of the war was an irresponsible waste of blood and bullets.

This brings an interesting question to mind. The Civil War was an “all or nothing” affair. The South either achieves independence — a sovereign political identity — or the Union is preserved status quo ante. There was no in between. To what extent did that play into strategic mindsets as strategy developed and evolved on each side (think Lincoln and Grant, and Davis and Lee)? Did it lengthen the war and thereby harden attitudes in the field as the war dragged on, and result in more casualties and destruction? Not only yes, but it couldn't have been any other way. Go back to the primary policy goals of each side: basically, do or die.

It was Jominian thinking that fed Davis' *defend everything* strategy; it was Clausewitzian thinking that drove Lincoln. Whether presumption or intuition, he knew the Union must destroy the South's ability to fight. That meant defeating the Confederate Army in the field, and that came to be focused on the AoNV, supported by Sherman's sweep through Georgia and up through the Carolinas. The Civil War, given its broad landscape and the depth of resources and manpower brought to bear, required broader vision to achieve success than the bulk of the American military, North and South, had been educated. Lincoln would sometimes fall victim to this limited thinking, but he managed to throw off such shackles. He encouraged his general to do the same, and he hired and fired until he found the winning combination.²⁸ Davis didn't rise up in the same way.

Lincoln understood the center of gravity concept that supported his aggressiveness — the strategy that eventually was implemented by Grant and Sherman. In a letter to Buell on January 13, 1862, Lincoln said, “With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way of making our advantage an over-match for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time; so that we can safely attack, one, or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize, and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.”²⁹ This was pure Grant before Lincoln knew who Grant was. Mass and maneuver; concentration in space and time – Jomini out; Clausewitz in. Lincoln knew he needed better senior



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commanders in the field, and he kept searching until he found Grant, a general who understood how to be decisive. When he gave Grant command of all Union armies in March 1864, he gave the Grant the authority to specify the strategic objective: the point upon which to concentrate the greatest effort, the gaining of which will mean the success or failure of the cause. It was destruction of the Confederate field forces. For Grant it was clearly Lee's army, and he intended it to be the same with other commands as well.³⁰ There is no stronger indicator of this than Grant deciding to not only locate his headquarters in the field, but to do so opposite Lee and the AoNV. These are excellent examples of how strategies can evolve and mature.

Southern generals had learned military theory at West Point at a time when the available text was heavily based on Jominian theory. They practiced that theory in the Mexican War, and used it throughout the Civil War, constantly seeking decisive field victories that would push the Union to peace. They should instead have engaged in what Jomini described as a defensive war to accomplish their political and military goals. As it was, the South exhausted itself. Union men and materiel losses were heavy, but better absorbed.

Union generals were equally influenced by Jomini as demonstrated by their reliance on concentration of force in a defensive posture, cautious movements, geometric lines of operations, set piece battles, capture and possession of territory, and such. (The so called Dare Line – the upper Rappahannock River – is a prime symbol.) Lincoln moved away from Jomini towards a Clausewitzian approach, finding his hammer in Grant. Grant clearly favored experience over theory when it came to fighting. In Lincoln and Grant, the full political and military powers of the Union were brought together to achieve victory.

We have seen how grand strategy is developed to achieve the primary political objectives of the nation and how the military strategy is formulated as a part of that grand strategy. The military strategy is derived from political aims, but it's formulation it is built on numerous factors that come into play. Strategy is developed to achieve political aims, but its content — the fabric and patchwork — is situation dependent, resource driven, and dynamic. Strategy formulation and application is a complicated, dynamic process, to say the least.

As we get into discussions of campaigns and battles (i.e., the operational level of the Civil War), we'll look at whether the military thinking was Jominian or Clausewitzian, and how well they supported the extant strategy. But that will be next year. See you in January 2019!



If you have the wrong tactics, but the right strategy, you will win. If you have the right tactics, but the wrong strategy, you will lose.

General Vo Nguyen Giap



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Many thanks to Jeff Ewing, John Mason, Arley McCormick, and Kent Wright for their valuable guidance and editorial support. --Emil

Notes –

¹ I sympathize with my antebellum brethren. The most popular translation in use today is Michael Howard's and Peter Paret's "On War" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Clausewitz's style was ponderously dense and pedantic. I confess that it took me three attempts over several years to work my way through most of it even using Howard's and Paret's iteration, with its indexing, commentary, and accompanying translations. Even with years of conversational German in high school and college, I found the thought of attempting "On War" in German intimidating in the extreme.

² *The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War*, Donald Stoker; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; 5.

³ This included not only the continuation but the expansion of slavery, and the desire to wall off states whose abolitionists would incite more slave rebellions (more John Brown's, as it were) – slave rebellions being a continuous fear since colonial times.

⁴ There was plenty of anti-secessionist, or Unionist, sentiment in the South, but it never posed a significant Confederacy-wide political threat to reverse secession and rejoin the Union.

⁵ This is a topic deserving of a separate paper. In the meantime, there are a couple sources that will be useful for independent reading: *A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War* (Amanda Foreman; New York: Random House, 2011) and *Our Man in Charleston: Britain's Secret Agent in the Civil War South* (Christopher Dickey; New York: Crown Publishers, 2015).

⁶ The US government estimated in January 1863 that the war was costing \$2.5 million daily. A final official estimate in 1879 totaled \$6.190 billion. <https://www.civilwarhome.com/warcosts.html>. That would equal close to \$96 billion today (2018). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index, prices in 2018 are 1,448.71% higher than prices in 1865. The dollar experienced an average inflation rate of 2.28% per year during this period. In other words, \$1 in 1865 is equivalent in purchasing power to \$15.49 in 2018, a difference of \$14.49 over 153 years. <http://www.in2013dollars.com/1865-dollars-in-2018?amount=1> The Confederacy spent perhaps \$2,099,808,707. Inflation affected both Northern and Southern assets but hit those of the



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Confederacy harder. Northern currency fluctuated in value. At its lowest point \$2.59 in Federal paper money equaled \$1 in gold. The Confederate currency so declined in purchasing power that eventually \$60-\$70 equaled a gold dollar. By 1906 another \$3.3 billion already had been spent by the US government on Northerners' pensions and other veterans' benefits for former Federal soldiers. Southern states and private philanthropy provided benefits to the Confederate veterans. The amount spent on benefits eventually well exceeded the war's original cost.

⁷ *London Times, July 18, 1861, as noted in James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 336.*

⁸ *Stoker, 17.*

⁹ *Stoker, 28-30.*

¹⁰ *Stoker, 39.*

¹¹ *Per Kent Wright: Britain recognized both the US and CS governments as belligerents while upholding the Lincoln government as the LEGAL government of all the American States. Belligerent status was an internationally recognized legal status short of diplomatic (official) recognition as an independent country. It simply recognizes the right of revolution for any nation (meaning a grouping of like-minded people). It is what made the war legal in the eyes of foreign nations. It was obviously not legal in the eyes of the established government, who had the recognized right to OPPOSE revolution. The British policies are most clearly stated in "No Need of Glory: The British Navy in American Waters, 1860-1864," by Regis Courtemanche, 1977, Naval Institute press.*

¹² *Note that the Mississippi River was (and still is) the boundary between states throughout most of its length. It's understandable that when it came time to designate military districts, it appeared to be a natural boundary line. In reality, it is rarely wise to make a prominent strategic feature a command boundary. The Mississippi River basin was a strategic target from the outset of the war, critical to maintaining the physical integrity of the Confederacy. The boundary between the Western and Trans-Mississippi Theaters should have been well to the west of the river to allow unity of command in its defense (think about Confederate command and control coordination issues with regard to Island Number 10, among other engagements along the Mississippi during the early stages of the war).*

¹³ *In Article XXXI "Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle," he wrote "An army reduced to the strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army receiving an attack may, during the progress of the*



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battle, take the offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it.” In theory, the defending forces would execute retrograde movements drawing the attacking forces with them, thus continually lengthening the attacking forces lines of communications. The defender would employ simultaneous raids or attacks against them with the goal of forcing the attacker to guard as much of his lines of communications as possible and thereby reducing the the main attacking force. Also, see Article XVI “Of the System of Operations” in which he speaks to advantages of offensive and defensive war.

¹⁴ Davis long favored offensive warfare over defensive and would continue to do so throughout the war. The South’s resources didn’t permit an extended conflict, though. If they didn’t force the North to peace within a campaign season or two, the North likely would overwhelm them. By taking the offensive, the Confederates hoped to crush or capture large Union armies but were never able to accomplish that goal. Instead of conserving their resources and remaining in defensive postures, they attacked the Union forces in eight of the first twelve major battles of the war. Over the course of the first three years of the war, the Confederate army almost bled itself to death by taking the offensive. Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson; Tuscaloosa: 1982; 5-7.

¹⁵ I believe the South’s only chance for an offensive victory lay in the East: Defeat the Union Army of the Potomac, move across the Potomac River into Maryland and Pennsylvania, threaten Philadelphia and New York, and thereby drive the Union to peace. They never had the legs for it, though. Lee tried three times (1862, 1863, and 1864) and failed. Very Jominian approach, too. The North’s combat power, in terms of human, manufacturing, and materiel resources, along with political determination (Copperheads and such notwithstanding) was enormous. On the other hand, the North’s key to an offensive victory lay in the Western Theater: Interdict the Mississippi River in its entirety, strangle foreign trade and supply via a blockade, and drive through the Tennessee Valley into the rich agricultural and manufacturing Deep South. This is what they did. Note that the constant hammering on the AoNV was indecisive until Grant and his 1864 Overland Campaign. In conjunction with Sherman’s March to the Sea and back up through the Carolinas (the culmination of the fight through central Tennessee – the area generally bounded by Memphis, Corinth, Chattanooga, and Knoxville), the Confederacy’s fate was sealed.

¹⁶ Due to space limitations, we’ll factor the use of railroads and other technological advances into the discussion of operations in future articles.

¹⁷ Paret’s “On War”, 204-205.



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¹⁸ Mass places overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time – synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time. (Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire (Chancellorsville, for example). Maneuver places the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.

¹⁹ Stoker, 352-354.

²⁰ For an interesting discussion of strategies promoted within Lincoln's cabinet see *A People's History of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Volume 5, Trial by Fire*, Page Smith; New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981; 97-99.

²¹ * Stoker, 45.

²² Another key part of Scott's thinking was a push by 75,000 men down the Mississippi to secure the river. In the event it took from March 1862 (New Orleans) to July 1863 (Vicksburg) and significantly more than 75,000 Union troops to secure the river. This is yet another indicator that, while he predicted a long war, Scott had no idea of the scale of the conflict to come.

²³ Another aspect Part 3 is going to look at generalship – what it took to be a good general, how senior generals were selected, and so forth. For now, we'll settle for the idea that leadership is a necessary factor in strategy development and in operational application.

²⁴ LTC Artulio J. Echevarria II, USA, "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought", *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2003, Vol LVI, No. 1.

²⁵ John Shy, "Jomini," in *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986; 152-4.

²⁶ To what extent was Virginia a Southern center of gravity? Recall Secessionist efforts to bring Virginia into the Confederacy, and Howell Cobb's declaration, "...We wanted to let Virginia know that whatever threats or dangers were presented to her, filled our hearts with sympathy for her, which we are willing to exhibit, to show that there was not a man in the Confederacy who was afraid to be at his post on Virginia soil... We felt the cause of Virginia to be the cause of us all. If she falls, we shall all fall; and we were willing to be at the spot to be among the first victims. We are ready to say to Lincoln, when he attempts to put



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his foot on Virginia soil, 'Thus far shalt thou come, no farther.'" [Richmond Dispatch, May 30, 1861] As the war wore on, Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, became the South's center of gravity. Davis was expendable; Lee and the AoNV wasn't. They were the Confederacy's life blood.

²⁷ Stoker, 37.

²⁸ Stoker, 79. Also see <http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-don-buell-january-13-1862/>.

²⁹ Some may point to Sherman's March to the Sea as straying from this objective, but that is an incorrect assessment. Sherman took the war into the Deep South, created havoc, destroyed railroads, manufacturing facilities, storage facilities, and materiel and agricultural supplies. In the process he sliced the Deep South in two, seized the major port and rail junction at Savannah, and then swung north through the Carolinas to directly support Grant's operations against the AoNV (and in the process kept Johnston from uniting his small army with Lee's). Properly synchronized operations.

Little Round Table Report; October 27, 2018: submitted by John H. Allen former President of the TVCWRT

The Great Sioux Uprising in Minnesota – August/December 1862

Synopsis, from Wikipedia - The Dakota War of 1862, was also known as the Sioux Uprising, Dakota Uprising, the Sioux Outbreak of 1862, the Dakota Conflict, the U.S.–Dakota War of 1862, or Little Crow's War.

The United States and Dakota leaders negotiated two treaties with the Indians in 1851, by which the Dakota ceded large tracts of land in Minnesota Territory to the U.S. in exchange for promises of money and goods. From that time on, the Dakota were to live on a 20-mile-wide Indian reservation centered on a 150 mile stretch of the upper Minnesota River.

However, the US Senate deleted Article 3 of each treaty, which set out reservations, during the ratification process. Much of the promised compensation never arrived, was lost, or was effectively stolen due to corruption in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Also, annuity payments guaranteed to the Dakota often were provided directly to traders instead (to pay off debts the Dakota incurred to the traders).

The uprising began on August 17, 1862, along the Minnesota River in southwest Minnesota, four years after its admission as a state. During the war, the Dakota made extensive attacks on hundreds of settlers and immigrants, which resulted in as many as 500 settler deaths, and caused



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many to flee the area. Intense desire for immediate revenge ended with soldiers capturing hundreds of Dakota men and interning their families.

A military tribunal quickly tried the men, sentencing more than 300 to death for their crimes (Lincoln cut the number to 39). The mass hanging of 38 Dakota men was conducted on December 26, 1862, in Mankato, Minn.; it was the largest mass execution in United States history.

Not so well-known results; because of the high demand for cadavers for anatomical study, several doctors wanted to obtain the bodies after the execution. The grave was reopened in the night and the bodies were distributed among the doctors, a practice common in the era. William Worrall Mayo received the body of Maḥpiya Akan Nažiŋ (Stands on Clouds), also known as "Cut Nose".

Mayo brought the body of Maḥpiya Akan Nažiŋ to Le Sueur, Minnesota, where he dissected it in the presence of medical colleagues.^{[28]:77-78} Afterward, he had the skeleton cleaned, dried and varnished. Mayo kept it in an iron kettle in his home office. His sons received their first lessons in osteology based on this skeleton.^{[28]:167} In the late 20th century, the identifiable remains of Maḥpiya Akan Nažiŋ and other Indians were returned by the Mayo Clinic to a Dakota tribe for reburial per the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.

TVCWRT Little Round Table Discussion Schedule, 2019

The Civil War west of the Mississippi river, 1861-62, a seven-part series

Take a glance at the schedule for 2019. There is time to jump in and learn a lot.

January 24, 2019 - John Pope, part 1, down the Mississippi in 1862

Led by John Scales

February 28, 2019 - John Pope, part 2, goes east and meets R. E. Lee

Led by Jeff Ewing

March 28, 2019 - Aug. 1862 to June 1863 - A dizzying 10-month transformation of the corps commands

Led by Jeff Ewing

April 25, 2019 - Two did not climb Culps Hill on 1 Jul, 1863: Generals Ewell and Slocum...why not?

Led by Jeff Ewing

23 May, 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 1- The decision to move the Army of the Potomac to the York Peninsula; the Siege of Yorktown

Led by Emil Posey

27 June, 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 2- Battles of Williamsburg, Fair Oaks

Led by John Mason



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25 July, 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 3- Jackson in the Valley, how he influenced the Peninsula Campaign

Led **Needed**

22 August, 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 4- Federal response to Jackson's success, The Army of Virginia

Led **Needed**

26 September, 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 5- Lee takes charge; both sides fortify and Feds emplace the siege guns; Stuart's Ride

Led **Needed**

24 October 2019 - Peninsula Campaign 6- Jackson comes from the Valley; Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill; Feds 'tap' the Richmond lines

Led **Needed**

12 December 2019 - The Most Important New Weapon of the American Civil War

Led by Mark Hubbs

Once again, many thanks Gregg Biggs for the much anticipated and always exciting presentation and this one on logistics. The forgotten combat multiplier.

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